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PATENT HOLDUP, THE ITC, AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST*
Colleen V. Chient & Mark A. Lemleytt
Patent-assertion entities, or "patent trolls," use the threat of injunction
to hold up product-producing companies in patent suits. The Supreme
Court's 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. largely en-
ded that practice, at least in federal courts. But it has had the unintended
consequence of driving patent assertion entities to a dfferent forum, the In-
ternational Trade Commission (ITC), in hopes of obtaining injunctive relief
no longer available in district courts. In this Article, we document that dra-
matic trend.
Because the ITC is an administrative agency, not a federal court,
eBay's discretionary test for injunctive relief doesn't apply. And because the
ITC can't award monetary damages, it has tended to grant injunctions as a
matter of course. But as we suggest in this Article, the Commission has more
power to adjust the remedies it grants than previously recognized. The ITC
should use this flexibility to craft exclusion orders that limit the ability of a
patentee to extract settlements that exceed the economic value of the patent, a
practice called "holdup." For instance, delaying the implementation of exclu-
sion orders and grandfathering in existing products could avoid holdup
problems. The Commission could also use bond and penalty provisions to
ensure that patentees receive compensation for ongoing infringement during
transition periods. If it uses its discretion wisely, the ITC can ensure that
patentees are adequately rewarded without falling victim to the patent
holdup problem that has beset district courts.
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Supreme Court's 2006 eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. decision,' district courts rarely grant injunctions
in patent infringement cases to patent-assertion entities (PAEs, also
known as "patent trolls"). PAEs assert patents as a business model,
traditionally using the threat of an injunction to reach a favorable set-
tlement with the defendant.2 That threat often results in patent
holdup. As Justice Anthony Kennedy articulated in his eBay concur-
rence, a holdup problem results when "an injunction . . . can be em-
ployed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees."3 By requiring
federal courts to consider the equities of a particular case before
granting an injunction, eBay solved much of the patent system's
holdup problem.
But the Court's ruling didn't eliminate injunction-based holdup
because another jurisdiction routinely grants injunctions in patent
cases: the International Trade Commission (ITC). In the past five
years, both PAEs and product-producing companies have flocked to
this once-obscure trade agency in search of injunctions or the credible
threat of injunctions.4 As the Commission itself explained: "[S]ince
1 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
2 Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HAsTINGs L.J. 297, 328 (2010) [hereinafter Chien, Arms
Race to Marketplace] ("[PAEs are] entities ... focused on the enforcement, rather than the
active development or commercialization of their patents."); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N,
THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION
8 n.5 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf ("[T]he
term 'patent assertion entity' . . . refer[s] to firms whose business model primarily focuses
on purchasing and asserting patents."). We use the term PAE at various points, rather than
the more popular (and more all-encompassing) "nonpracticing entity" (NPE) because, as
our data show, various types of NPEs do obtain injunctions after eBay while PAEs rarely do.
3 eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4 See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA.
L. REv. 529, 529, 532 (2009); Editorial, The Android Patent War, WALL ST.J., Dec. 5, 2011, at
AI6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB000142405297020482670457707452
3539966352.html (subscription required); see also The Evolving IP Marketplace: Hearing Before
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the U.S. Supreme Court's 2006 eBay decision, which has made it more
difficult for patent-holders that do not themselves practice a patent to
obtain injunctions in district courts, exclusion orders have increas-
ingly been sought by non-practicing entities that hold U.S. patents."5
The result is that the ITC is busier with patent cases than it has ever
been before.6
The double standard in patent law about when an injunction is
available has drawn the scrutiny and, in some cases, the fury of the
mainstream media,7 commentators, 8 practitioners,9 Congress,10 and
the Fed. Trade Comm'n, 127 (2009), available at http://ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace
/aprl7/transcript.pdf (statement of Laura G. Quatela, Chief Intellectual Property Officer
and Vice President, Eastman Kodak Co.) ("[eBay has] driven a lot of litigation towards the
ITC, and that trend is clear.").
5 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 21 (2011),
available at http://www.usitc.gov/pressjroom/documents/budget_2012.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Jenna Greene, Record Number of ITC Cases Filed in First Half of 2011, THE
BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (June 30, 2011, 3:52 PM), http://egaltimes.typepad.com/
blt/2011/06/record-numberof-itc-cases-filed-in-first-half-of-2011.html. The ITC instituted
fifty-six intellectual property investigations in the first nine months of 2011, as many as it
did in all of 2010, and a record sixty-nine investigations throughout fiscal year 2011. Section
337 Statistical Information, U.S. Iwr'L TRADE COMM'N, http://www.usitc.gov/press-room/
337 stats.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
7 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Op-Ed., Patents and the Public Interest,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/opinion/patents-smart
phones-and-the-public-interest.html?_r=2; Editorial, Smoot-Hawley's Revenge, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 23, 2006, at Al0 (describing section 337 as "potentially crippling the U.S. wireless-
phone industry"); Editorial, The Android Patent War, supra note 4 (calling an ITC patent
case "a weapon of protectionist mass destruction against competitors" and section 337 an
"absurdity ... that could do great economic harm to one of the few U.S. industries that is
growing rapidly").
8 See, e.g., K. WILLIAM WATSON, CATO INST., STILL A PROTECTIONIST TRADE REMEDY-
THE CASE FOR REPEALING SECTION 337, at 3 (2012), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
pas/PA708.pdf (recommending that the ITC's section 337 patent authority be abolished);
Thomas A. Broughan, III, Modernizing § 337's Domestic Industry Requirement for the Global
Economy, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 41, 78-79 (2009) (noting and describing the divergence in fed-
eral court and ITC rules and law); Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical
Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 63,
67-68 (2008) [hereinafter Chien, Patently Protectionist] (same); Taras M. Czebiniak, When
Congress Gives Two Hats, Which Do You Wear? Choosing Between Domestic Industry Protection and
IP Enforcement in § 337 Investigations, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 93-94 (2011) (same); Rob-
ert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of Interna-
tional Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 457, 464 (2008) (same); Kumar,
supra note 4, at 532-33 (same); see also Eric L. Lane, Keeping the LEDs on and the Electric
Motors Running: Clean Tech in Court After eBay, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. i, 1-li, XXX-XXXI
(noting that nonpracticing patentees have moved to the ITC to avoid eBay and warning
that this may "adversely affect implemented clean technologies").
9 See, e.g., Edward H. Rice & Marina N. Saito, After eBay: Can the ITC Offer Better Reme-
dies than District Courts?, INTELL. PROP. LITIG., Winter 2008, at 13 passim, available at http://
www.loeb.com/afterebaycantheitcofferbetterremediesthandistrictcourts/; James R. Klaiber
& Ethan Lee, Seeking Disapproval: Presidential Review of ITC Orders, LAw360 (Nov. 10, 2011,
12:51 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/283970/seeking-disapproval-presidential-
review-of-itc-orders (subscription required).
10 See The International Trade Commission and Patent Disputes: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Intellectual Prop., Competition and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
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the Federal Trade Commission." In effect, the ITC's practices have
undone many of the desirable consequences of eBay.
The ITC issues exclusion orders12 that prevent the importation of
a product. Exclusion orders can have a dramatic impact because, to
comply with them, a company must pull its products from the market
and redesign them.' 3 Many household devices, including computers,
flat-screen televisions, GPS devices, and printers, have been the sub-
jects of ITC section 337 investigations.14 In 2011, every major
smartphone maker was embroiled in an ITC dispute.'5 As the impact
(2012) [hereinafter Hearing on the ITC and Patent Disputes] (statements of Colleen V. Chien,
Santa Clara University Law School, Neal A. Rubin, Vice President of Litigation, Cisco Sys-
tems, Inc., and David B. Kelley, Intellectual Property Counsel, Ford Global Technologies
LLC), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/hear 07182012
.html; Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential
Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Hon.
Edith Ramirez, Comm'r, Federal Trade Commission), available at http://wwwjudiciary.
senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=45dca2a38e7309dal9dce3a4ccO6b8l7.
11 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 239 ("[The] discrepancy [between the ITC
and district court injunction standards] has generated some concern that the ITC may
attract suits by patentees that are less likely to obtain injunctions in district court, poten-
tially leading to hold-up and ... resulting [in] consumer harm . . . .").
12 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006). An ITC cease-and-desist order has a similar effect. Id.
§ 1337(f).
13 See Kumar, supra note 4, at 538; see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent
Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1991, 1996 (2007) (discussing withdrawal from
the market in the context of downstream firms).
14 See generally Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
691, USITC Pub. 4290 (Nov. 2011) (Final) (printers); Certain Computer Products, Com-
puter Components and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-628, USITC Pub. 4197
(Oct. 2010) (Final) (computers); Certain Flat Panel Digital Televisions and Components
Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-733, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,286 (Aug. 13, 2010) (Preliminary)
(flat screens); Certain GPS Chips, Associated Software and Systems, and Products Contain-
ing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-596, USITC Pub. 4133 (Mar. 2010) (Final) (GPS devices).
15 Certain Mobile Devices, Associated Software, and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-744 (May 15, 2012) (Final) (Notice of a Commission Final Determination of Viola-
tion of Section 337; Issuance of a Limited Exclusion Order; Termination of Investigation;
Respondent Motorola Mobility, Inc.); Certain Electronic Devices with Communication Ca-
pabilities, Components Thereof, and Related Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-808, 76 Fed. Reg.
60,870 (Sept. 30, 2011) (Preliminary) (Notice of Institution of Investigation; Institution of
Investigation Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1337; Complainant HTC Corp. and Respondent Apple
Inc.); Certain Wireless Devices with 3G Capabilities and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-800, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,252, 54253 (Aug. 31, 2011) (Preliminary) (Notice of Institu-
tion of Investigation; Respondent Nokia Corp.); Certain Mobile Telephones and Modems,
Inv. No. 337-TA-758, 2011 ITC LEXIS 1557 (Aug. 11, 2011) (Preliminary) (Order 17; Com-
plainant Sony Corp. and Respondent LG Electronics, Inc.); Certain Electronic Devices,
Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices,
and Tablet Computers, Inv. No, 337-TA-794, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,860 (Aug. 1, 2011) (Prelimi-
nary) (Notice of Institution of Investigation; Institution of Investigation Pursuant to 19
U.S.C. 1337; Complainant Samsung Electronics Co. and Respondent Apple Inc.); Certain
Mobile Telephones and Wireless Communication Devices Featuring Digital Cameras, and
Components Thereof, at 2, Inv. No. 337-TA-703, 2011 ITC LEXIS 1112 (June 30, 2011)
(Final) (Notice of Commission Determination to Affirm in Part and Reverse in Part a De-
termination of No Violation of Section 337; Remand of the Investigation for Further Pro-
ceedings; Respondents Apple Inc. and Research in Motion Ltd.). Major mobile handset
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of this trade agency has grown, mainstream commentators have
warned that the ITC "could do great economic harm to ... U.S. indus-
tries that [are] growing rapidly."' 6 Calls for legislative reform of the
ITC have also intensified' 7 based on the perception that the ITC's
exclusion orders are "economically destructive and inflexible."18 The
difficulty is that the ITC can't award damages; it can only exclude
products in what might seem to be an all-or-nothing affair.19
We believe, however, that the Commission has more flexibility in
its choice of remedies than has previously been recognized. In this
Article, we offer suggestions for how the ITC can use its statutory au-
thority to minimize harm to the public interest when deciding both
whether to grant an exclusion order and how to structure that order.
In the Parts that follow, we review the rules the ITC uses to decide
whether to grant an injunction.20 While the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has held that eBay's equitable test does not apply
to the ITC,2 1 the agency must consider the effect of an injunction on
the public before it orders one. 2 2 To date, the ITC hasn't given these
public interest factors many teeth. We think the ITC should pay more
attention to the public interest, using prevailing economic theory and
its precedents to assess the impact of patent injunctions on consumers
and competitive conditions.
and smartphone makers, based upon market share, include Apple, Samsung, Sony, LG,
HTC, Motorola, Nokia, and RIM. See Raj Chowdary, Global Smartphone Sales for 2011 Pegged
at 420 Million Units [Infographic], INFOGENRA (July 28, 2011), http://www.infogenra.com/
global-smartphone-sales-for-201 1-pegged-at-420-million-units-infographic.html.
16 Editorial, The Android Patent War, supra note 4.
17 See Michael A. Ladra, Latham & Watkins, Domestic Disturbances: The Latest from
the ITC on Establishing a Domestic Industry, Presentation at the 12th Annual Silicon Val-
ley Advanced Patent Law Institute (Dec. 9, 2011) (describing Fall 2011 efforts to lobby
Congress to change the ITC); Bernard J. Cassidy, Follow the Money-Will the ITC Lose Its
PatentJurisdiction?, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 27, 2012, 7:05 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2012/02/27/follow-the-money-will-the-itc-lose-its-patent-jurisdiction/id=224 70/ ("[The]
'ITC Working Group' . .. [is a lobby that] wants to block the International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC) from hearing patent infringement cases brought by 'non-practicing entities'-
i.e., patent holders like universities, independent inventors, and others who license their
patents for manufacturers to commercialize. And second, it wants to weaken the ITC's
power to block the importation of infringing products into the U.S."). But see Chien &
Lemley, supra note 7 (arguing that legislative reform of the ITC is not necessary). Repre-
sentative Devin Nunes has circulated a draft bill to eliminate the licensing prong of the
domestic industry requirement, which would shut PAEs out of the ITC. Michael G. Mc-
Manus & Rodney R. Sweetland, ITC Continues to Set a High Bar for LicensingBased Domestic
Industries, MARTINDALE.COM (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.martindale.com/administrative-
law/article Duane-Morris-LLP_1579880.htm.
18 Editorial, The Android Patent War, supra note 4.
19 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (f) (2006).
20 The ITC offers three forms of injunctive relief: a limited exclusion order, a general
exclusion order, and a cease-and-desist order. Id. § 1337(d)-(f).
21 Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For an argument that
the eBay test should apply to the ITC, see FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 31-72.
22 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
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In a common patent infringement case, for example, the patent
covers a small part of a larger product, and the defendant infringes it
inadvertently. If an interoperability standard covers the infringing
feature, 23 removing the feature may disable the product.24 Eliminat-
ing a big product from the market because of a small patent harms
consumers, and blocking a large number of lawful components and
features from the market along with the infringing one distorts
competition. 25
In another common situation, a patent holder sues a large num-
ber of companies, threatening to hobble an entire industry. An in-
junction would exclude many participants from the marketplace and
dramatically reduce competition.26
In each of these scenarios, the harm to consumers and competi-
tion from an exclusion order is greater than the contribution made by
the individual infringing component. As carmaker Ford put it: "By
the time a manufacturer enters production, the company has spent
great sums of money on design integration, tooling, and other invest-
ments to incorporate a particular technology. The technology itself
may not be valuable-it may be trivial-but it is very expensive to
change it after the investments have been made."27
To address these harms, the ITC could decline to award exclu-
sion orders at all. But this solution would leave the patentee without a
remedy, at least in the ITC. Alternatively, the Commission could issue
exclusion orders but structure them to ameliorate the harms to com-
petition and consumers. In this Article, we discuss three methods of
structuring injunctions to reduce harm: tailoring injunction scope,28
staying injunctions, and bonding.
23 On the prevalence of industry standards in many industries, see Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1889, 1892-95
(2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights].
24 For example, Innovatio IP Ventures has sued several companies including Cisco,
Motorola, Accor North America, Caribou Coffee Co., Inc., Cosi, Inc., Dominick's Super-
markets, Inc., LQ Management LLC, Meijer, Inc., and Panera Bread Company on patents
directed at the IEEE 802.11 standards, better known as "Wi-Fi." See Defendants' Motion to
Stay This Mater Pending Resolution of Cisco Systems, Inc. and Motorola Solutions, Inc. v.
Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 1:11-CV-00425 (D. Del.) at 1, 3, Innovatio IP Ventures,
LLC v. ABP Corp., No. 1:11-cv-01638 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://vmo-
blog.com/files/106598-99438/lnnovatioVentures_(CustomersMotion-toStay).pdf. If a
wireless router doesn't comply with this standard, it can't provide wireless services. See id.
at 6-7.
25 See generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 1992-93 (demonstrating how
holdup costs affect manufacturers).
26 See S. Ru'. No. 93-1298, at 197 (1974).
27 Hearing on the ITC and Patent Disputes, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of David B.
Kelley, Intellectual Property Counsel, Ford Global Technologies LLC).
28 The proper scope of patent injunctions has recently come under greater scrutiny.
See, e.g., Tivo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 879, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc);
[Vol. 98:16
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These possibilities provide the ITC with previously unappreciated
flexibility in ordering remedies. In a case in which the defendant can
design around the infringing component of a product, for example,
awarding an injunction but delaying its start could deter infringement
in a way that would minimize disruption to consumers and holdup to
manufacturers.29 And delay can achieve these benefits without inter-
fering with patentee incentives: In addition to bringing a case in the
ITC, patentees can seek damages in federal court for infringing sales.
If the patent were truly essential, the patentee could obtain an injunc-
tion after the stay expired. Alternatively, a change to the ITC's gov-
erning statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, or the way the Commission applies it,
would enable the ITC to extend the terms of the bond it normally sets
during the presidential review period to compensate for the entire
stay period.30
Some cases may warrant more significant limitations on exclusion
orders. Suppose, for instance, that an infringing component is small
but, because of the nature of the product, the potential impact of an
exclusion order on downstream products, related products, and third
parties is large. In such a case, the Commission could tailor the scope
of the injunction to reduce harm to competition by grandfathering in
existing products.
The ITC already has the ability to use the injunction levers we
have identified in these situations?' In this Article, we explain why
the ITC has this power and develop the economic grounding for how
the Commission could apply it. Alternatively, if the ITC won't use its
existing public interest authority (or if the Federal Circuit won't let
it), Congress could easily act to apply eBay to the ITC. But we don't
think that sort of congressional action is necessary32 : the ITC has
proven to be adaptive to the changing conditions of competition, and
the agency is in a better position than the Federal Circuit or Congress
to adapt its decision making to the particular facts before it. Indeed,
Congress has even given the ITC the authority to take into account
consumers and competition. The ITC, in short, already has the power
John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) than "Off Switches": Patent-Infnngement Injunc-
tions' Scope, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1399, 1400-02 (2012) thereinafter Golden, Injunctions].
29 See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 2035-40 (showing that a stay in injunc-
tive relief to allow design-arounds significantly reduces holdup risk).
30 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j) (2006) (describing the presidential review process). Effect-
ing such a change might require tweaking the statutory language or delaying final entry of
ITC orders pending the period of delay. See infra Part III.C.
31 Cf infra Part III (describing the limited times in which the ITC has used these
injunction-tailoring methods before).
32 And, indeed, one of us has relayed this opinion to Congress. See Hearing on the ITC
and Patent Disputes, supra note 10 (statement of Colleen V. Chien, Santa Clara University
School of Law).
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to factor in the effect of an exclusion order on competition; now it
must use that power.
A move away from the current practice of issuing automatic, im-
mediate, and comprehensive exclusion orders does have a downside:
it decreases the clarity about the remedy and the predictability that
has long been associated with the ITC. But we think this loss of cer-
tainty is outweighed by the benefits to competition of tailoring reme-
dies to the facts of the case. And the ITC can use early proceedings
on issues of public interest and remedy33 to provide notice to litigants
about the likelihood and form of an exclusion order if the patentee
prevails.
In Part I of this Article, we examine how eBay has affected patent
law and practice, both in the federal district courts and in the ITC. In
particular, our empirical study shows the increasing use of the ITC,
particularly by PAEs filing complaints against multiple defendants. In
Part II, we review the public interest factors the ITC must consider
before awarding an exclusion order and describe how the economic
theory of holdup maps to these factors. In Part III, we discuss the
ITC's options for tailoring injunctive relief.
I
THE RuSH TO THE ITC
The Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay34 represented a sea
change in patent litigation. Before 2006, a patentee who won its case
was entitled to an injunction that prevented the defendant from sell-
ing its product.3 5 The result was a significant problem of patent
holdup.3 6 Patentees who owned rights in very small pieces of com-
plex, multicomponent products could threaten to shut down the en-
tire product.37 As a result, even a very weak patent could command a
high royalty in settlement from defendants afraid of gambling their
entire product on a jury's decision.38
eBay changed this dynamic. Under eBay, district courts must con-
sider four equitable factors before granting an injunction, including
whether there would be irreparable harm and whether public and pri-
vate interests, on balance, favor granting or denying the injunction.39
Justice Kennedy, concurring in eBay, emphasized that injunctions
33 Using a motion analogous to a summary judgment motion in district court, parties
in the ITC can move for summary determination on any issue in a section 337 investiga-
tion. Summary Determinations, 19 C.F.R. § 210.18 (2012).
34 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
5 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 2008-09.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
3 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
[Vol. 98:18
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might be inappropriate when the plaintiff licenses the patent as a bus-
iness model or when the patent covers only a small component of the
product.40
Courts have considered these factors for centuries in deciding
whether or not to award an injunction.4 1 The four-factor test reflects
the Supreme Court's often-repeated belief that an injunction is an
"extraordinary remedy."42 In the marketplace, a product injunction
disrupts the free flow of goods and services, impacting not only the
parties but also the public, who must abruptly adjust to life without
the enjoined product or service.4 3 By its terms, eBay prescribes injunc-
tive relief as a last-ditch option, justified only when money can't fix the
harm and when the hardships and public interest, carefully consid-
ered, weigh in favor of an injunction. 4 4
Commentators predicted that eBay would make injunctions
harder to get.4 5 They were right. Based on our review of district court
decisions since eBay,46 courts have granted about 75% of requests for
40 See id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("When the patented invention is but a
small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well
be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the
public interest.").
41 See DoucLAs LAVcocK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 19-23 (1991)
(tracing the origins of the "irreparable injury rule" to the specialization in remedies by the
courts of chancery and the courts of law in fourteenth-century Britain and the transmission
of the rule to the courts of the colonies and United States in the seventeenth century). But
see DoUGLAs LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 426-27 (3d ed.
2002) (criticizing the majority's characterization of the traditional four-factor test as the
norm in remedies law).
42 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citing R.R.
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
379 (1976) ("[T]he principles of equity ... militate heavily against the grant of an injunc-
tion except in the most extraordinary circumstances.").
43 See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. SACV 05467 JVS (RNBx), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, at *15, *20, *28 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007) (citing the harm to the
public that removing a "beneficial, cutting-edge service" from millions of customers would
cause and tailoring the injunction to allow for an eighteen-month transition period); Paice
LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600, at *16 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (discussing the potential disruption of an injunction against Toyota's
hybrid cars to car dealers, parts suppliers, and related business entities), affd in part, va-
cated in part, and remanded, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
44 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-92. For an argument that courts should consider effects
on innovation directly when evaluating injunctions, see generally Sarah R. Wasserman
Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM, U. L. REv. 733 (2012).
45 See, e.g., Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 51, 52.
46 Using data from Patstats.org, we analyzed 192 decisions from July 26, 2006 to Au-
gust 5, 2011. In a few instances that we checked, the injunction was later vacated due to a
change in the court's liability determination. However, because the later determination
did not challenge the reasoning of the court in these instances, we kept the cases and the
decisions on injunction in our database. An updated version of the database, through
December 4, 2011, includes over 200 decisions. US. Patent Litigation Statistics, PAT-
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injunctions,4 7 down from an estimated 95% pre-eBay.4  Another con-
sequence of the decision is that courts now distinguish between differ-
ent types of entities and their different types of behavior. Among
different types of nonpracticing entities (NPEs) ,"4 individuals and uni-
versities have enjoyed higher-than-average injunction-grant rates, but
courts have denied injunctions to PAEs about three-quarters of the
time. When the injunction was contested, the PAE denial rate was
over 90%, as Figure 1 shows.o
FIGURE 1: DISTRICT COURT INJUNCTION-GRANT RATES BY ENTIY TYPE
(JULY 2006 To AUGUST 2011)
100%
80%-
60% -
20%
University Individual Practicing Patent Patent
Company Assertion Assertion
Entity (Total Entity
Requests) (Contested
Requests)
Category Grant Rate Granted Denied Total
University/Research Organization 100% 3 0 3
Individual 90% 9 1 10
Practicing Company 5 79% 126 33 159
PAEs52 (total requests) 26% 5 14 19
PAEs 3 (contested requests) 7% 1 14 15
STATS.ORG, http://patstats.org/Patstats2.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) (click on "Post-
eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings in Patent Cases to 7-30-12").
47 Accord FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 217 (reporting an injunction rate of
72% to 77%).
48 See Kristy Downing & Gary Frischling, Injunctive Relief After eBay v. MercExchange,
Presentation to the AIPLA 2007 Annual Patent Law Committee 12 (Oct. 19, 2007), availa-
ble at http://www.justintellectuals.com/publications/InjunctiveReliefAfterEbay.ppt
(describing the pre-eBay injunction rate at about 95%).
49 This term is broader than PAE because it includes universities and individuals.
50 We assumed that any denied injunction request was a "contested" injunction
request.
51 This category includes cases brought by i4i, LP, and US Philips Corp., the patent
subsidiaries of operating companies i4i, Inc. and Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.
(Royal Philips Electronics), respectively. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Iwasaki Elec. Co., 505
F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("U.S. Philips Corporation is 'an IP holding company on
behalf of. . . the overall Philips organization' and has no employees."); U.S. Philips Corp.
v. Iwasaki Elec. Co., No. 03 Civ. 0172 (PKC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71276, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.
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These results may seem surprising, particularly the finding that
certain NPEs have been more successful than practicing companies at
obtaining injunctions. Based on our analysis of post-eBay district court
decisions, however, we found that courts have reached remarkably
consistent results across a range of fact patterns. For example, courts
deny practicing companies an injunction when those companies
aren't practicing the particular patent they've asserted.5 4 Courts also
deny injunctions when a practicing company can't show irreparable
harm because it's part of a multiple-competitor market, precluding
the court from concluding that the defendant's gains have come at
the plaintiffs expense.55
Conversely, universities, which do not practice their own patents,
have been able to win injunctions by suing on behalf of their exclusive
licensees who are in fact practicing the patent.5 6 Of all groups, PAEs
are least likely to obtain an injunction; they tend to succeed in their
requests only when the defendant fails to object.5 7 In the single post-
Sept. 28, 2006) ("The Local Rule 1.9 Statement filed by U.S. Philips reveals that there is a
public affiliate known as 'Koninklijike Philips Electronics N.V."'), affd in part, vacated in
part, and remanded, 505 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
52 We identified PAEs using internet research and case pleadings.
53 For a description of the reasoning of these cases, see infra note 57.
54 See, e.g., Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., No. 06-cv462-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38220, at *3-4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2010), aff'd in part and vacated in part, No. 2007-
1567, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6660 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4 2011). This case was described in the
press under the headline "Ricoh Gets the Troll Treatment." Jan Wolfe, Patent Litigation
Weekly: At Injunction Time, Ricoh Gets the Troll Treatment, THE PRIOR ART (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the-priorart/2010/04/ricoh-v-quanta.htmi.
5s See, e.g., LG Elecs. U.S.A. v. Whirlpool Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 541, 562-63 (D. Del.
2011); Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 2d 383, 408 (D. Del. 2010),
rev'd, 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vas-
cular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554, 559-60 (D. Del. 2008).
56 See, e.g., Emory Univ. v. Nova Biogenetics, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0141-THT, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 57642, at *3-4, *12-13 (N.D. Ga. July 24, 2008); Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Datascope Corp., 513 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581 (D. Md. 2007), rev'd and remanded, No. 2007-
1530, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 20740 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2008).
For a discussion of universities as NPEs, see generally Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities
Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & Ew-r. L.J. 611, 629-30 (2008) (arguing
that they aren't).
57 PAEs have obtained five injunctions since eBay. Systemation, Inc. v. Prod. Prods.,
Inc., No. 1:1lev-487-LPS, slip op. at 1-2 (D. Del. June 27, 2011) (entering an injunction
because two of the parties settled); Irrevocable Trust of Antonious v. Merchs. of Golf, Inc.,
No. CV 10-02634 ODW (CWx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3332, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal.Jan. 5, 2011)
(setting aside a default judgment and an injunction previously entered because the defen-
dant failed to respond); PB&J Software, LLC v. Code 42 Software, Inc., No. 09-cy-00206
DWF/JSM (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2010), (entering a final judgment for permanent injunctive
relief against defendant Cucku, Inc., who stipulated to this relief); Joyal Prods., Inc. v.
Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172 (JAP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531, at*30-31, *33
(D.N.J.) (granting an injunction where the plaintiff was not an ongoing business and
looked to sell its patent because failure to grant an injunction would severely affect the sale
value of the patent), affd, No. 2009-1095, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23315 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22,
2009); Acticon Techs. v. Heisei Elecs. Co., No. 06-CV-4316 (KMK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8978, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2008) (adopting the magistrate judge's findings because the
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eBay case we found in which a no-longer-practicing company sued and
succeeded in receiving a contested injunction, the court cited its be-
lief that the company would sell the patent to a manufacturer. 5
When applying eBay, courts have focused on the irreparable in-
jury and adequate remedy at law factors.59 Competitive considera-
tions predominate: courts grant injunctions when the defendant's
infringement credibly threatens the market share,60 reputation,6 ' or
business model62 of the plaintiff and deny injunctions when these
harms are absent.63 Predicted loss of market share, reputation, and
defendant failed to object to the magistrate judge's report), adopting, No. 06 Civ.
4316(CM) (MDF), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100081, at *10-12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2007). But see
Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623, at *18-19, *21
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006) (denying an injunction because harm to the right to exclude
was not enough to justify granting one), affd in relevant part and rev'd in relevant part, 536
F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
58 JoyalProds., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531, at *30-31 (holding that the ailing plain-
tiffs patents would be worth less in the marketplace if the company was unable to or inca-
pable of excluding others, and "the most likely purchaser of the patent would be a
manufacturer"). But see Voda, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623, at *18-19, *21 (finding that
harm to the right to exclude is not enough to justify an injunction).
59 It is hard to come up with circumstances that would distinguish irreparable injury
from the absence of an adequate remedy at law.
60 A number of courts have cited market-share-related reasons in deciding to grant
injunctions. See i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 599-601 (E.D.
Tex.) (citing injury to market share and brand), affrd in relevant part, 589 F.3d 1246 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Injunctive Relief at 9,
Global Traffic Techs. LLC v. Tomar Elecs., Inc., No. 05-756 MJD/AJB (D. Minn. Jan. 21,
2009) (market share, customer relationships); Emory, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57642, at *12
(citing competition in a two-competitor market); Johns Hopkins, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 586
(same); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. SACV 05-467JVS (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97647, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007) (citing market-share injury based on "the
'design-win' nature of the market"); Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. CIV-04-
1693-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51669, at *16 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006) (citing injury to
market share and damage to reputation); see also Advanced Cardiovascular, 579 F. Supp. 2d
at 558 (noting that injunctions are usually granted in two-competitor-market scenarios).
61 See, e.g., Emory, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57642, at *12-13 (citing harm to reputation
and goodwill); Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492
F. Supp. 2d 600, 604 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (citing harm to reputation), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 542 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008);Johns Hopkins, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 586 (same).
62 See, e.g., ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v. Diamond Innovations Inc., No. 6:08-CV-325, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83011, at *35-36 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2010) (granting an injunction where
the court found disruption to the plaintiffs business, licensing, and pricing strategy);
Judkins v. HT Window Fashions Corp., 704 F. Supp. 2d 470, 477 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (granting
an injunction where an exclusive licensor would experience harm to business relation-
ships); Joyal Prods., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531, at *30-31 (finding that the denial of an
injunction would decimate the value of the patent in a planned asset sale).
63 See, e.g., LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 541, 563 (D.
Del.) (citing the presence of a multiple-competitor market), rev'd and remanded, No. 2011-
1096, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20700 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 13, 2011); Enpat, Inc. v. Budnic, 773 F.
Supp. 2d 1311, 1317 (M.D. Fla.), injunction granted, No. 6:11-cv-86-PCF-KRS, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37440 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 2011); Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 748 F.
Supp. 2d 383, 408 (D. Del. 2010) (citing the presence of a multiple-competitor market),
rev'd, 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., No. 06-cv-462-
bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38220, at *3-4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2010) (finding that plaintiff
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goodwill are difficult to quantify and restore, making money damages
inadequate in cases in which these harms occur.64 Entities that don't
sell products typically don't experience these types of injuries.65
The relationship between the patented invention and the en-
joined product also matters to courts. Following Justice Kennedy's
suggestion,6 6 when the patented invention covers a small component
of the defendant's product, courts have been less inclined to award an
injunction.6 7 Courts have also taken into account the impact of an
was not in competition with defendant because plaintiff did not practice invention), affd in
part and vacated in part, No. 2007-1567, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6660 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4 2011);
Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 984-85 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(finding no harm to reputation but harm to defendant's business); Telcordia Techs., Inc.
v. Cisco Sys., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727, 747 (D. Del. 2009) (finding no evidence of "lost sales,
licensing, or research and development opportunities"); Creative Internet Adver. Corp. v.
Yahoo!, 674 F. Supp. 2d 847, 852 (E.D. Tex. 2009); Advanced Cardiovascular, 579 F. Supp.
2d at 559 (citing the presence of a multiple-competitor market); Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am.
Honda Motor, No. 06cv2433 DMS (CAB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106476, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 18, 2008) (finding insufficient evidence of lost opportunities and harm to reputa-
tion); Orion IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 6:05 CV 322, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108683, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2008); Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor, Ltd., No.
06-0162 MMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12183, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008) (finding no loss
of market share, reputation or brand); Sundance, Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd., No.
02-73543, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007) (citing the presence of
a multiple-competitor market); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600, at *13-14 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (finding the plaintiff
unable to prove damage to market share or brand name and finding no evidence that
money damages were inadequate to compensate licensing company's loss), affd in part,
vacated in part, and remanded, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007); WhitServe LLC v. Computer
Packages, Inc., No. 3:06CVO 1935 (AVC) (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2011) (denying an injunction
because there was no evidence of lost market share, customers, or goodwill).
64 Emory, 2008 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 57642, at *13.
65 NPEs sometimes assert injury to their reputation resulting from the fact that the
defendant used a product that turned out to be covered by the patent claims. See Common-
wealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 604. This theory strikes us as
wildly implausible. To the extent consumers are even aware of the patent and the fact that
the defendant infringes it, it's hard to see how awareness of that fact will injure the NPE's
reputation. If anything, the widespread use of the patentee's technology should enhance
its reputation.
66 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
67 See Ricoh, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38220, at *6 (noting that the component at issue
was a small part of the overall product); Sundance, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158, at *7-8
(noting that the patented technology was but one feature of the defendant's product); z4
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (stating that in a
small component scenario, damages are sufficient); see also Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm
Inc., No. SACV 05-467JVS (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, at *19-21 (C.D. Cal. Dec.
31, 2007) (tailoring the injunction to ameliorate the impact on consumers by providing
time for design-around when the scope of the infringed patent is limited); Steve Malin &
Ari Rafilson, Sidley Austin LLP, Empirical Analysis of Permanent Injunction Decisions Fol-
lowing eBay 29 (Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarket-
place/febll /docs/smalin.pdf (reporting a district court injunction rate of 0% when the
invention was a "trivial component" of a product, as compared to 75% grant rate when the
infringing feature was not a trivial component).
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injunction on consumers under the auspices of the public interest
prong of the four-factor test.68
Hundreds of district courts throughout the country have thus en-
gaged in the same process of considering whether an injunction is
justified in patent infringement cases. Yet one decision maker has
been exempt from doing so. The ITC, an administrative agency
rather than Article III court, has declined to follow eBay--a practice
that the Federal Circuit has approved.69 This apparent anomaly has a
simple explanation: although the ITC applies patent law70 to decide
whether an unlawful importation has occurred,71 the Commission fol-
lows its own procedures and prescribes its own remedies. As the Fed-
eral Circuit explained in Spansion, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission, " [there are] different statutory underpinnings for .. . Sec-
tion 337 actions [in the ITC] and . .. district courts in suits for patent
infringement."7 2 As a result, the ITC neither hears counterclaims nor
recognizes certain defenses to infringement,73 and it can't award dam-
ages.74 Congress foreclosed these district court options to speed ITC
proceedings, 75 reflecting its original intent for the ITC to offer a spe-
cial solution to the problem of foreign infringement.76 Now that most
technology products are manufactured overseas77 and Congress has
68 See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 213 (D.
Mass.) (considering patient health, Medicare savings, and the public's interest in a robust
patent system in deciding whether to grant an injunction), affd per curiam, No. 2008-1300,
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21702 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2008).
69 Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
70 In addition to patent law, the ITC also applies other forms of intellectual property
law. SeeTianRui Grp. Co. v. ITC, 661 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (confirming that
section 337 applies to imported goods produced through the exploitation of trade secrets).
The majority of section 337 cases, however, are patent cases. See Chien, Patently Protectionist,
supra note 8, at 70 & n.123 (stating that patent cases make up 85% of the ITC's section 337
docket and explaining why copyright and trademark cases are less likely to be brought in
the ITC). The Commission has heard a handful of antitrust cases, and commentators have
speculated that the ITC could also decide child labor and other violations. See, eg., A
LAWYER'S GUIDE To SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS BEFORE THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION 226-27 (Tom M. Schaumberg ed. 2010). One bill introduced in 2012 would
give the ITC the authority to oversee the issuance of cease-and-desist orders against "rogue
websites" for copyright infringement. Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital
Trade Act, H.R. 3782, 112th Cong. (2012).
71 19 U.S.C § 1337(a) (1) (B) (2006).
72 629 F.3d at 1359.
7 See Kinik Co. v. ITC, 362 F.3d 1359, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that 35
U.S.C. § 2 7 1(g) (2) does not apply in the ITC); Colleen V. Chien, Protecting Domestic Indus-
tries at the ITC, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 169, 171 (2011) [hereinafter
Chien, Protecting Domestic Industries] ("In an ITC proceeding, thcrc are no juries, no coun-
terclaims, few stays for reexamination, and no damages." (footnotes omitted)).
74 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
75 See Czebiniak, supra note 8, at 93-94, 105-06.
76 See id. at 95.
77 See, e.g., Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related
Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331, at 77 (July 15, 2011) (Final) (commission
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relaxed the domestic industry requirement,7 8 nearly every patentee
can bring an ITC complaint, and nearly every accused infringer is a
potential ITC defendant, converting the ITC into a mainstream venue
in which to file patent grievances.7 9
The history and structure of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 mean that it is out
of sync with the rest of the patent system in certain ways. Certain legis-
lative and judicial changes to patent law procedures and remedies
don't apply in the ITC. When Congress recently enacted a rule limit-
ing the naming of multiple defendants in a patent infringement law-
suit,s0 for example, the reform did not extend to the ITC.a' While the
number of defendants per case declined in the district court immedi-
ately following passage of the law, it has remained steady in the ITC, as
Figure 2 shows.
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS PER CASE IN THE ITC AND
DISRuCT COURTS BEFORE AND AFTER PASSAGE OF THE AMERICA
INVENTs ACT OF 2011
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opinion) ("[T]o HTC's knowledge no smartphones ... are produced in the United States;
rather they are all manufactured overseas and imported in the United States." (first altera-
tion in original) (quoting The HTC Respondents' Opening Brief on Commission Review
at 161, Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related Software,
Inv. No. 337-TA-710 (2011) (USITC Pub. 4331))).
78 See InterDigital Commc'ns, LLC v. ITC, No. 2010-1093, 2012 WL 3104597, at
*10-11 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2012) (finding that the relaxed domestic industry requirement
can be satisfied by U.S. patentees licensing other imported products); John Mezzalingua
Assocs. v. ITC, 660 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing the statutory change
that permitted PAEs to claim "domestic industry" status at the ITC and interpreting the
new statute); Czebiniak, supra note 8, at 110.
79 See Czebiniak, supra note 8, at 107-08. Figure 4, infra, reports the growth in the
portion of ITC cases involving NPEs.
80 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(d), 125 Stat. 284,
332-33 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2011)) (limiting joinder
of defendants to cases relating to the same transactions, occurrences, or accused
products).
81 See Chien, Protecting Domestic Industries, supra note 73, at 175.
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eBay has created the most pointed rift between district courts and
the ITC. While the overall injunction rate in district courts has de-
clined to 75% since eBay, prevailing patentees have continued to be
able get injunctive relief relief at the ITC.8 2 (Figure 3) The difference
in grant rates is even more dramatic for PAEs: they are unlikely to
obtain an injunction from a district court 3 but, based on the ITC's
track record, are virtually guaranteed one in the ITC should they pre-
vail.84 This discrepancy is due in part to the fact that injunctions are
not only the preferred remedy at the ITC, they are the only remedy.85
As an agency whose administrative law judges conduct investigations
without juries, the ITC is not statutorily authorized to grant money
damages.8 6
FIGURE 3: INJUNCTION-GRANT RATE IN THE ITC AND DISTRICT COURTS
PRE- AND POST-EBAY
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Litigants are aware of this limitation and view the ITC as being "a
more advantageous forum for patent holders with what is viewed to be
82 See infra Figure 3.
83 See supra Figure 1.
84 See infra Figure 3. Although, as would be expected in a business model that uses
the threat of an injunction, rather than an actual injunction, to get royalties, few NPEs
have actually received an exclusion order. See U.S. INr'L TRADE COMM'N, FACTS AND
TRENDS REGARDING USITC SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONs 3, available at http://
www.usitc.gov/press-room/documents/featurednews/337facts.pdf (describing the cases
where an NPE has been able to get an exclusion order) (hereinafter FACTS AND TRENDS].
85 See Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing the statute's
legislative history for the proposition that "an injunction is the only available remedy for
violations of Section 337").
86 See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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a less stringent standard for obtaining injunctive relief."8 7 NPEs are
flocking to the ITC.88 In the years following eBay, the number of ITC
investigations brought by NPEs has grown from two in 2006 to sixteen
in 2011, and the number of total respondents named in NPE cases has
grown from eight to 235 within the same time period.89 Growth in
NPE-initiated ITC cases has outpaced that in ITC cases in general dur-
ing this period, with the NPE share of all ITC cases growing from 7%
to 25%90 and the number of respondents from NPE-initiated ITC
cases growing to over 50% of all ITC respondents, as Figure 4 shows.
Based on a separate analysis of patents asserted over an eighteen-
month period, we find that PAE complainants are more often than
not using patents that they purchased, not technologies they
invented.9'
87 Albert B. Chen & Matthew F. Abbott, Protecting Green Patents: District Court vs. ITC,
IAw360 (Jan. 5, 2012, 12:46 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/295637/protecting-
green-patents-district-court-vs-itc (subscription required).
88 See infra Figure 4; see also Robert D. Fram & Ashley Miller, The Rise of Non-Practic-
ing Entity Litigation at the ITC: The State of the Law and Litigation Strategy 10 (Oct. 22,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (finding an increase in the number
of ITC complaints brought by companies relying on their licensing activities in accordance
with 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (3) (c) to show standing from 13% from 2000 to 2006 to 27% from
2007 to August 2010).
89 We relied on a proprietary database of ITC cases maintained by RPX Corporation
(RPX ITC Database) that includes NPE coding. To verify its reliability, we independently
coded ninety-one investigations from January 2011 to June 2012, resulting in a 2% disa-
greement rate. RPX includes in its definition of "NPE" universities and individuals as well
as PAEs.
90 Using the RPX ITC Database, we determined that NPEs brought two out of twenty-
seven ITC patent cases in 2006 and sixteen out of sixty-three ITC patent cases in 2011. The
ITC's official statistics divide NPEs into Category 1 and Category 2 and show lower but still
substantial growth in NPE cases, from around one out of fourteen (7%) in the second half
of 2006 to thirteen out of sixty-eight (19%) in 2011. See FACTS AND TRENDS, supra note 84,
at 2. The growth in ITC cases is somewhat surprising in light of some commentators'
concern that the ITC's decision in Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade Commission,
545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), would result in a noticeable decline in ITC filings. See
Christopher A. Cotropia, Strength of the International Trade Commission as a Patent Venue, 20
TEX. INTELL. Paop. L.J. 1, 3 (2011). This concern hasn't materialized. See id. at 4.
91 Available assignment records at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office indicate that
at least fifteen of the twenty-three PAE investigations initiated between January 2011 and
June 2012 were brought based on patents reassigned from their original owner, in some
cases many times. For example, based on our analysis, patent 5,862,511 was reassigned
seven times before being asserted by Beacon GmbH of Switzerland in the ITC investigation
Certain Automotive GPS Navigation Systems, Components Thereof and Products Containing Same,
Inv. No. 337-TA-814, 76 Fed. Reg. 72,442 (Nov. 23, 2011) (Preliminary) (Notice of Institu-
tion of Investigation).
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FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF CASES AND RESPONDENTS IN THE ITC
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This divergence in remedies undoes the progress eBay repre-
sents.93 Parties who win in district court but would not receive an in-
junction under eBay can circumvent this result by refiling their cases
in the ITC94 because a district court's denial of an injunction request
92 As a point of comparison, the ITC's official statistics show that (based on a visual
estimate of their graphs), in 2011, Category I and 2 NPEs brought 19% of suits (thirteen
investigations brought by Category 1 and 2 NPEs out of sixty-eight total in 2011) and
named 41% of defendants (two-hundred-and-five named by Category 1 and 2 NPEs out of
five-hundred-and-five total in 2011). See FACTS AND TRENDS, Supra note 84, at 2, 4.
93 The divergence is also potentially illegal under international law. Statutory
changes to the law in 1995 were meant to cure the statute of the advantages it gave to
domestically made goods-specifically a mandatory timetable, parallel proceedings against
foreign manufacturers, and the inability of defendants to raise counterclaims-which a
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel found to be in violation of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). See Report
of the Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Taiff Act of 1930, 1 4.2, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989),
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990). The logic of that case, that certain domestically
made goods may be immune from injunctions while international ones are not, could
similarly be found to violate national treatment. See id.; see also Comment Regarding the
ITC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Its Rules of Practice and Procedure from the
Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.ccianet.org/
CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/00000000552/CCIA%2Comments%20ITC%20
Rulemaking%20MISC-032.pdf (suggesting that the ITC adopt eBay in order to comply with
the United States' obligations under Article 111:4 of the GATT, as articulated in the panel
report United States-Section 337 of the Tanff Act of 1930, supra).
94 Compare, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. (Paice II), 504 F.3d 1293, 1314-15 &
n.14 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding the district court's failure to issue an injunction), with
Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-688, 74
Fed. Reg. 52,258 (Oct. 9, 2009) (Preliminary) (Notice of Investigation) (initiating an inves-
tigation of the behavior not enjoined by the district court). See also Chien, Protecting Domes-
tic Industries, supra note 73, at 185-86 & nn.96-102 (describing the situation of Paice II in
both the district court and the ITC).
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is no barrier to the grant of an exclusion order by the ITC. The result
is an end-run around eBay that allows patent holders to block the de-
fendant's product even without a district court injunction.
II
EXCLUSION ORDERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The ITC statute does not compel the Commission to grant exclu-
sion orders. It states:
If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation
under this section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall
direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person violating
the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the
United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, the production of like or directly competi-
tive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it
finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry.95
The Federal Circuit parses the statute to identify four separate public
interest factors,96 including "(1) the public health and welfare;
(2) competitive conditions in the United States economy; (3) the pro-
duction of like or directly competitive articles in the United States;
and (4) United States consumers."9 7
Taken together, these factors might seem to give the ITC a fairly
wide-ranging power to consider things like patent holdup, the rela-
tionship between the patent and the ultimate product, and whether or
not the patentee practices the invention. Indeed, the statute directs
the ITC to take the public interest into account every time it considers
issuing a remedy.98
Nonetheless, in the vast majority of section 337 cases, the ITC
finds that excluding goods does not threaten the public interest. The
ITC has found that the public interest trumped exclusion in only
95 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006).
96 See Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
97 Id. (citation omitted).
98 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (covering exclusion orders); id. § 1337(f)(1) (cov-
ering cease-and-desist orders). Indeed, we believe that the mandate that the ITC "shall"
exclude articles "unless" one of the public interest cautions otherwise, as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, requires their consideration, more so than it does the ITC's remedy.
See, e.g., Certain Automated Mechanical Transmission Systems for Medium-Duty and
Heavy-Duty Trucks and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-503, USITC Pub. 3934, at 7
(May 9, 2005) (Final) (Commission Opinion) ("Section 337(d) and (f) directs the Com-
mission to consider public interest factors before issuing remedial orders, including the
effect of any such remedial order on the 'public health and welfare, competitive conditions
in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the
United States, and United States consumers.'" (citation omitted)).
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three cases: car parts necessary for improved fuel efficiency," scien-
tific equipment for nuclear physics research, 00 and hospital burn re-
covery beds.o10 The unifying theme in these cases is that the products
were necessary for something socially important (human health or
some other nationally recognized policy goal), and no other supplier
could meet demand in a commercially reasonable time period. 02
The ITC also decided these cases more than twenty-five years ago.
More recently, the ITC has indicated that, unless the contested prod-
uct is a drug or medical device, it is unlikely to meet the public inter-
est exception.103
The ITC views enforcing patents as in the public interest, result-
ing in a thumb on the scale in favor of the patentee in public interest
analyses. The Federal Circuit has accepted this approach. In San
Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,104
the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC's imposition of a significant pen-
alty, saying: "Finally, addressing the 'public interest' factor, the Com-
mission determined that the public interest favors the protection of
intellectual property rights and weighs in favor of a 'significant pen-
alty."'10 5 And the court has interpreted the legislative history of the
ITC statute as supporting exclusion of infringing products: "The legis-
lative history of the amendments to Section 337 indicates that Con-
gress intended injunctive relief to be the normal remedy for a Section
337 violation and that a showing of irreparable harm is not required
to receive such injunctive relief."10 6 The Federal Circuit's review of
99 See Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at
1 (Dec. 17, 1979) (Final) (Commission Determination and Order); see also id. at 17-18
(Opinion of Vice Chairman Alberger and Commissioners Bedell and Stern); infra notes
109-112 and accompanying text (discussing ITC denials of remedies based on the public
interest exception).
100 See Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119, at 1, 22-31 (Dec. 29, 1980) (Final) (Commission Action and
Order); infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
101 See Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-182/188, USITC Pub. 1667, at 1-2 (Oct. 5, 1984) (Final) (Commission Memoran-
dum Opinion); infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
102 See infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
103 See Certain Toothbrushes and the Packaging Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-391, USITC
Pub. 3068, at 6 (Oct. 15, 1997) (Final) (Commission Opinion on Remedy, the Public Inter-
est, and Bonding) ("[T]oothbrushes are not the type of product that have in the past
raised public interest concerns (such as, for example, drugs or medical devices).").
104 161 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
105 Id. at 1363. But cf Rosemount, Inc. v. ITC, 910 F.2d 819, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("We
also agree with the Commission's rejection of the view that the public interest inevitably
lies on the side of the patent owner because of the public interest in protecting patent
rights, although that is one factor to consider and may be a dominant factor.").
106 Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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ITC remedies is deferential,107 meaning that most of the substantive
discussions of the public interest factors occur in ITC decisions, not
Federal Circuit decisions.
In the three cases in which the ITC has in fact denied injunctive
relief, its focus has been on two of the public interest factors: the pub-
lic interest in health and welfare and the unavailability of alternatives.
It has only denied an exclusion order when both factors are
present.108
The ITC first denied a remedy on the basis of the public interest
exception in Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders.'09 The ITC based its
decision on the public interest in fuel efficiency, which automobile
manufacturers claimed was put in jeopardy without access to the
crankpin grinders at issue.x"0 In denying an exclusion order, the ITC
noted that the domestic industry could not meet demand in a reason-
able length of time and that the president and Congress had a clearly
established policy of increasing fuel economy."' The existence of a
major oil crisis in 1979 probably also contributed to the decision."x2
107 Id. ("[The Federal Circuit] reviews the Commission's action in awarding injunctive
relief as to whether it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.").
108 See Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119, at 1, 21-31 (Dec. 29, 1980) (Final) (Commission Action and
Order); Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at
17-18 (Dec. 17, 1979) (Final) (Opinion of Vice Chairman Alberger and Commissioners
Bedell and Stern).
109 Inv. No. 337-TA-60, at 17-18 (Opinion of Vice Chairman Alberger and Commis-
sioners Bedell and Stern).
110 See id. at 18.
111 See id. at 20.
112 The Commission wrote:
The primary reason for our determination is that the domestic indus-
try cannot supply the demand for new orders of the patented product
within a commercially reasonable length of time.
In view of the fact that Congress and the President have also clearly
established a policy requiring automotive companies to increase the fuel
economy of the automobiles they produce and that some of these compa-
nies are encountering difficulties in obtaining automatic crankpin grinders
on a timely basis, to produce the statutorily mandated energy efficient auto-
mobiles, we believe that it is not in the public interest to provide a remedy
in this case. In this period of rapid changes in the energy field, there are
overriding public interest considerations in not ordering a remedy which
will hamper the supply of energy efficient automobiles. This is not merely a
matter of meeting the demands of individual consumers for fuel efficient
automobiles. The public as a whole has an interest in conserving fuel
through the provision of energy efficient alternatives represented in this
case by automobiles with more efficient engines which are produced with
the assistance of crankpin grinders which are the subject of this
investigation.
Id. at 18, 20.
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The ITC issued a similar decision the following year in Certain
Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereofi 3 There, the
Commission was confronted with claims of public interest in "pure
scientific research and the advancement of knowledge." 1 l4 The ITC
concluded that the infringing Dowlish tubes were "greatly superior"
and "substantially less expensive" than their counterparts and "indis-
pens[a]ble" to research that was in the public interest.'1 5 Thus, as in
Crankpin Grinders, the Commission believed both that the public
needed the infringing products for health and welfare reasons and
that the products wouldn't be available if it granted the exclusion
order.
The final case in which the Commission denied an exclusion or-
der is Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus and Components Thereof' 16
Unlike the other two cases, this case involved denial of temporary re-
lief under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e).11 The ITC noted that this procedural
posture allowed it more discretion in framing a remedy, just as district
113 Inv. No. 337-TA-67, at 1, 22-31 (Commission Action and Order).
114 Id. at 21.
115 Id. at 27. The Commission wrote:
We believe that basic scientific research, such as the nuclear structure
research conducted with inclined-field acceleration tubes, is precisely the
kind of activity intended by Congress to be included when it required the
Commission to consider the effect of a remedy on the public health and
welfare... . Although there are few indications in the record of practical
applications for nuclear structure physics, it shows that the tubes at Los
Alamos are used for nuclear weapons development and the University of
Arizona uses them as mass spectrometers for carbon 14 dating, essential to
paleontological and archaeological applications. Many scientists would ar-
gue, of course, that basic research is intrinsically beneficial regardless of
immediate practical application. The support of universities and public
agencies is ample support for that proposition.
Finally, the President and the Congress have issued declarations of sup-
port for basic science research. The National Science Foundation Act,
which supports with grants much of the research done with both the do-
mestic and imported tubes, is codified in title 42, United States Code,
which is entitled Public Health and Welfare.
... The users consider the Dowlish tube to be greatly superior in per-
formance to the High Voltage tube-not to mention substantially less ex-
pensive-and therefore indispensible [sic] to their research efforts. The
tubes provide the greater stability of operation and more consistent results
essential for accurate research.
Once the importance of basic research in nuclear structure physics is
established, we are faced with a difficult balance-the impact of a remedy
on users of the imported device versus the impact of the violation on the
owner of the patent. After weighing these considerations, we determine
that public interest factors preclude a remedy in this investigation.
Id. at 22-23, 27, 29 (footnotes omitted).
116 Inv. No. 337-TA-182/188, USITC Pub. 1667 (Oct. 5, 1984) (Final) (Commission
Memorandum Opinion).
117 See id. at l.
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courts have more freedom to deny preliminary injunctions.' Fluid-
ized Supporting Apparatus involved hospital burn recovery beds.'19 The
ITC concluded that the infringing beds "provide [d] benefits unavaila-
ble from any other device or method of treatment" and that other
suppliers could not meet the demand within a reasonable time. 120
The Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that
"if a temporary exclusion order were issued some patients might not
have access to burn beds at all in the interim period," both because of
the patentee's higher prices and because of concerns about the ability
of the patentee to meet manufacturing demand.12 ' Unlike the others,
this case focused more on the public interest in health than on un-
availability, but the Commission did find at least partial
unavailability.12 2
In contrast to these cases, the Commission has regularly rejected
public interest arguments when it finds either that alternative suppli-
ers can't provide comparable products or that the products aren't crit-
ical to public health and welfare. For example, the Commission has
recognized the public interest in supplying consumers with needed
drugs.' 2 3 However, it has held that if the patentee can supply all do-
mestic demand, there is no public interest problem even if the paten-
tee would satisfy the demand only at a higher price.12" Significant
118 See id. at 3 ("[I]f the relevant substantive elements are established, the issuance of
temporary relief is largely discretionary, while the issuance of permanent relief is
mandatory.").
119 Id. at 1.
120 Id. at 23 (quoting SSI Petition for Review at 4, Inv. No. 337-TA-182/188 (Oct. 5,
1984)).
121 See id.
122 See id. at 23-25.
123 See Certain Crystalline Cefadroxil Monohydrate, Inv. No. 337-TA-293, USITC Pub.
2391 (Mar. 21, 1990) (Final) (Commission Opinion on the Issue Under Review, and on
Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding).
124 Id. at 46-47.
There is, of course, an additional public interest in maintaining an ad-
equate supply of pharmaceuticals for U.S. consumers. This interest also
does not bar relief. Bristol has sufficient capacity and resources to satisfy all
domestic demand for cefadroxil, as it had until respondents entered the
market in March 1989. Moreover, the availability of other cephalosporins
will not be affected by the issuance of relief. The record indicates that Bris-
tol perceives a number of these cephalosporins to be competitive with
cefadroxil; that at least one of the competitive cephalosporins, cephalexin,
is available in generic form; and that, even if generic cefadroxil were un-
available .... [t]he record consequently refutes respondents' contention
that granting relief will somehow deprive the ill and indigent of necessary
medication.
The only remaining argument respondents make is that granting relief
will raise prices to consumers. The Commission has previously held that
this alone is not sufficient grounds for denying relief.
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted); see also Certain Gaming and Entertainment
Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752, 2012 ITC
LEXIS 1225 (May 7, 2012) (Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bonding)
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public health interests, then, aren't enough to cut against an injunc-
tion unless coupled with unavailability.
On the other end of the spectrum, the Commission has held that
the unavailability of equivalent products is insufficient grounds to re-
fuse an exclusion order when the products do not affect important
health or welfare interests. In Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems
and Components Thereof the respondent argued that the patentee's
hardware logic emulators weren't an effective substitute because those
emulators weren't of the same quality as the respondent's. 125 The
Commission rejected that argument, not by disagreeing with the fac-
tual claim, but by concluding that emulators weren't critical to the
public interest:
[H]ardware logic emulators are not the type of product that has in
the past raised public interest concerns (such as, for example, drugs
or medical devices) and we are not aware of any other public inter-
est concern that would militate against entry of the remedial orders
we have determined to issue. 26
Thus, the confluence of both the unavailability of alternatives and the
important nature of the product seems necessary for the Commission
to deny an exclusion order.127
This result might not seem particularly encouraging for the use
of the public interest exceptions to combat patent holdup. Patent
holdup tends to occur in complex, multicomponent products, partic-
ularly in information technology industries.128 Holdup is a greater
risk in those industries not only because more patents are asserted
(banning Xbox gaming consoles where the only two competitors could satisfy demand and
noting that "there is a strong public interest in enforcing intellectual property rights; not
enforcing those rights in light of a potential economic impact occurs only in exceptional
circumstances").
125 Inv. No. 337-TA-383, USITC Pub. 2991, at 8 (Oct. 15, 1996) (Commission Opinion
on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding).
126 Id. at 9.
127 See Certain Toothbrushes and the Packaging Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-391, USITC
Pub. 3068, at 6 (Oct. 15, 1997) (Final) (Commission Opinion on Remedy, the Public Inter-
est, and Bonding) ("[T]he public interest favors the protection of U.S. intellectual prop-
erty rights, the U.S. market for toothbrushes of the type at issue could be supplied by
complainant or by noninfringing alternatives, and toothbrushes are not the type of prod-
uct that have in the past raised public interest concerns (such as, for example, drugs or
medical devices)." (footnote omitted)); Certain Processes for the Manufacture of Skinless
Sausage Casings and Resulting Product, Inv. No. 337-TA-148/169, USITC Pub. GC-84-187,
at 13 (Nov. 9, 1984) (Preliminary) (Review of Initial Determination, Remedy, Bonding,
and the Public Interest) ("Sausage casings are not an essential item for the preservation of
the public health and welfare.").
128 See FEo. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 3, 35, 160. Indeed,John Turner finds that
PAEs depend for their business model on a critical mass of other inventions made by prod-
uct-producing companies. John L. Turner, Patent Thickets, Trolls and Unproductive En-
trepreneurship 3 (Oct. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1916798.
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there but also because those patents tend to cover small parts of much
larger products. 29 A patent that covers the active ingredient in a
drug gives the patentee the right to prevent the sale of that drug-
that isn't holdup but the patentee's normal right to exclude infring-
ing products. By contrast, a patent on a particular circuit layout may
constitute only a tiny fraction of the value of a microprocessor that
uses the layout, but an exclusion order will exclude the microproces-
sor as a whole, preventing the defendant from importing both the
small infringing element and the much larger noninfringing ele-
ments. The social harm in this latter case is disproportionate to the
social benefit, as many productive, noninfringing components will be
shut down to give the patentee control over only a single, small com-
ponent. The ITC cases applying the public interest exception, how-
ever, have generally not found much of a public health and welfare
interest in information technology products, where the holdup prob-
lem is most acute.13 0
Nonetheless, there are reasons to think the application of the
public interest factors going forward may be broader than it has been
in the past. Notably, the ITC has traditionally focused most of its at-
tention on only a subset of the statutory factors. The Commission has
paid close attention to the effect of exclusions on the public health
and welfare and the production of like or directly competitive articles
in the United States.13 1 In contrast, it has paid very little attention to
competitive conditions in the U.S. economy and the effect of exclu-
sions on U.S. consumers. 32
129 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One
Not to), 48 B.C. L. REv. 149, 150-51 (2007).
130 SeeJ. Gregory Sidak, The Law and Economics of Section 337 Exclusion Orders for Patent
Infringement at the International Trade Commission 49-60 (Criterion Economics LLC, Working
Paper Series, 2011) [hereinafter Sidak, Law and Economics] (arguing that the existing pub-
lic interest analysis at the ITC does not sufficiently take account of the problem of holdup).
131 See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
132 Congress indicated that competitive conditions were intended to be an important
part of the public interest analysis:
The Committee believes that the public health and welfare and the assur-
ance of competitive conditions in the United States economy must be the
overriding considerations in the administration of this statute. Therefore,
under the Committee bill, the Commission must examine (in consultation
with other Federal agencies) the effect of issuing an exclusion order or a
cease and desist order on the public health and welfare before such order is
issued. Should the Commission find that issuing an exclusion order would
have a greater adverse impact on the public health and welfare; on compet-
itive conditions in the United States economy; on production of like or
directly competitive articles in the United States; or on the United States
consumer, than would be gained by protecting the patent holder (within
the context of the U.S. patent laws) then the Committee feels that such
exclusion order should not be issued. This would be particularly true in
cases where there is any evidence of price gouging or monopolistic prac-
tices in the domestic industry.
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Today, the mix of cases before the Commission has changed. In
a traditional case in which a domestic company sues a foreign coun-
terfeiter, the public interest is clear: ban the importation. But this
type of case is less and less common; only 12% of ITC cases fit the
prototypical profile of a domestic plaintiff suing a foreign defen-
dant.133 Though section 337 was created to keep foreign pirates out
of American markets, recent PAE cases have targeted domestic com-
panies almost twice as often as foreign ones (209 times versus 123
times, respectively). 4
Cases brought against "knockoffs" are also comparatively rare-
58% of cases were brought against public companies, which are, for
reasons of reputation and brand, unlikely to fit the "counterfeiter"
category. 35 More cases also now fit the PAE profile. 36 In addition,
reversing the traditional roles, foreign patent holders have sought to
enjoin domestic companies from importation. In 2011, Beacon Navi-
gation GmbH, a Swiss patent-holding company with few U.S. employ-
ees and no products, research, or development related to the accused
product (it had purchased patents from another party) ,13 sued all
major carmakers for their use of GPS navigation systems.'3 8 That
same year, MOSAID Technologies Inc., a Canadian PAE with a shell
U.S. operation, brought an ITC action against American technology
companies accusing infringement of patents it bought from a bank-
rupt Israeli startup.139
In the wake of eBay and various changes to the ITC statute and
case law, PAEs are flocking to the ITC, both because of the relaxed
domestic industry requirement 40o and because courts are no longer a
S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 197 (1974).
133 Chien, Patently Protectionist, supra note 8, at 89 & 89 tbl.3.
134 Based on an analysis of 332 unique respondents named in PAE suits from January
2011 to June 2012 and relying on the ITC's official case summaries (OUII Investigative
Histories), 123 were from foreign jurisdictions and 209 were from domestic jurisdictions.
See infra Appendix A.
135 Chien, Patently Protectionist, supra note 8, at 92 tbl.4.
136 See supra Figure 4.
137 Hearing on the ITC and Patent Disputes, supra note 10, at 3 (statement of David B.
Kelley, Intellectual Property Counsel, Ford Global Technologies LLC).
138 Certain Automotive GPS Navigation Systems, Components Thereof, and Products
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-814, 76 Fed. Reg. 72,442 (Nov. 23, 2011) (Preliminary)
(Notice of Institution of Investigation).
139 Certain Equipment for Communications Networks, Including Switches, Routers, Gateways,
Bridges, Wireless Access Points, Cable Modems, IP Phones, and Products Containing Same, Inv. No.
337-TA-778, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,154 (June 21, 2011) (Preliminary) (Notice of Institution of
Investigation); see Hearing on the ITC and Patent Disputes, supra note 10 (statement of Neal A.
Rubin, Vice President of Litigation, Cisco Systems, Inc.).
140 See Czebiniak, supra note 8, at 110.
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sure bet for injunctions. 41 PAEs disproportionately bring cases in-
volving complex, multicomponent technologies. 142
As a result, the balance of public interest factors is different today
than it traditionally has been. First, one of the factors that the Com-
mission has always considered important-whether another company
will fill the gap created by exclusion-is less likely to be satisfied when
the complainant doesn't practice the patent. That is especially true
when the patentee complains against a host of companies at once, as
is often the case in PAE actions.'43 If the patentee claims that the
entire industry infringes, all producers will be subject to the exclusion
order, and thus no company will be available to fill market demand.144
Second, both competitive conditions and consumers are affected
to a greater degree by the grant of exclusion orders in complex, mul-
ticomponent cases than in traditional counterfeiter cases. Exclusion
orders affect not just the supply of the infringing feature but also the
price and supply of noninfringing features and functionalities, the
customers and third parties who rely on these noninfringing features,
and-through the mechanism of holdup-the research and develop-
ment activities of companies that make the noninfringing compo-
nents.145 Patent holdup was not a feature of most ITC actions until
recently because PAEs didn't sue entire industries and suits didn't
usually involve complex, multicomponent products. 4 6 The changed
circumstances permit the ITC to take a different approach.
Recent ITC action suggests that the Commission may be open to
rethinking its public interest case law. The ITC has received more
141 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
142 Eighty-six percent of ITC cases filed by NPEs between 2005 and 2011 were in high-
tech sectors. See Michael Kallus &James Conlon, RPX Corp., International Trade Commis-
sion: The Second Theater 16-17 (Oct. 3, 2011) (on file with authors) (showing that 86%
of ITC NPE cases involved mobile communications, semiconductors, consumer electron-
ics, PCs, networking, storage, software, or ecommerce technologies, in contrast to ITC
cases in general, 63% of which involved these sectors).
143 See supra Figure 2.
144 The issue is more complex when the patentee sues an entire industry but settles by
licensing its patent to some parties before trial. In that case, some parties will be able to
sell licensed products even if an exclusion order issues against the remaining defendants.
But saying that whether a patentee can exclude defendants should depend on whether
other defendants choose to go to trial seems odd. District courts after eBay have been
unwilling to view nonexclusive licenses granted in settlement of patent disputes as evi-
dence of irreparable injury justifying injunctive relief. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006). The same logic might apply here.
145 See, e.g., Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver
(Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular
Telephone Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258, at 1 (June 7, 2007) (Final)
(Order to Cease and Desist) (restricting Qualcomm's research, development, and testing
of broadband base processors); see also id. at 154 (June 19, 2007) (Final) (Commission
Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding) (rejecting Qualcomm's position
that a cease-and-desist order would impair the public interest).
146 See supra Part I.
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attention from Congress' 47 and other agencies and, as a result, is
more cognizant of the context of its actions. In 2011, the ITC incor-
porated public interest considerations into its decision not to deny,
but instead to delay the start of, an exclusion order in a case involving
smartphones.148 Around that time, the ITC changed its rules to allow
an administrative law judge, under Commission order, to take evi-
dence on the public interest at the outset of a case rather than waiting
until the end.149 The information gathered through this process
could be used to identify likely remedies earlier in the proceedings,
leading to more efficient resolution of cases.
We applaud this new-found flexibility. In the next Part, we offer
specific suggestions for how the Commission could update the public
interest considerations for the new, post-eBay world.
III.
TAILORING, BONDING, AND PAUSING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Remedies in the ITC might seem to be an all-or-nothing affair:
the ITC can't award damages; it can only exclude products.o50 As a
result, even judges and Commissioners who believe an exclusion or-
der is not in the public interest might hesitate to apply the public
interest standard to deny relief for fear that the patentee will win its
case but receive no remedy at all. That fear has always been somewhat
overstated; patentees can file suit in district court in parallel with the
ITC (and do so two-thirds of the time 51 ) and may be entitled to an
award of damages in court even if neither the ITC nor the court en-
joins the sale of the defendant's product.152 But that may be cold
147 See sources cited supra note 10; see also Certain Wireless Communication Devices,
Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, Inv.
No. 337-TA-745, 77 Fed. Reg. 58,576, at 1-2 & n.4 (June 6, 2012) (Preliminary) (Third
Party United States Federal Trade Commission's Statement on the Public Interest), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf (noting that Congress re-
quired that the ITC "consult with, and seek advice and information from . .. the Federal
Trade Commission ... as it considers appropriate" (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (2) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
148 Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related Software,
Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331, at 3 (Dec. 19, 2011) (Final) (Limited Exclusion
Order); see also Chien & Lemley, supra note 7 (recommending this very tailoring remedy in
that case).
149 19 C.F.R. § 210.8, .10(b), .14(f), .42(a)(1)(ii)(C), .50(a) (4) (2012).
150 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); Chien, Patently Protectionist, supra note 8, at 102.
151 Chien, Patently Protectionist, supra note 8, at 70 ("[Sixty-five] percent of the ITC
cases studied had a district court counterpart . . . .").
152 In the case of copending ITC and district court cases, the district court case shall be
stayed upon a timely request. See 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) (2006) ("[The] district court shall
stay, until the determination of the Commission becomes final, proceedings in the civil
action with respect to any claim that involves the same issues involved in the proceeding
before the Commission . . ."). The ITC's findings are not accorded res judicata by the
courts. Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568-69
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comfort to patentees who have wasted the time and effort of going to
the ITC only to have the Commission give them no remedy. And the
Commission may understandably be reluctant to condemn itself to
seeming irrelevance.
While the ITC's remedies seem limited, we think that the Com-
mission has more flexibility than previously recognized. Historically,
the ITC has demonstrated flexibility at several points by restricting the
relief given to patentees. In 1981, the Commission created a limited
exclusion order to supplement the remedy of a general order as "a
limitation on the relief afforded a prevailing complainant."15 3 It did
so while determining the proper scope of an injunction, even though
"Congress ha[d] never specifically authorized the Commission to issue
limited exclusion orders as the final remedy in a section 337 investiga-
tion."15 4 In Certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Compo-
nents Thereof Products Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making
Such Memories (EPROMs), the Commission devised a special nine-fac-
(Fed. Cir. 1996). Yet, in practice, the district courts are expected to reach a similar result
on the same claims and explain and distinguish the ITC decision if they don't.
The timing of claims may affect the nature of the remedies. The ITC has held that it
has no power to grant an exclusion order if a district court has already awarded an ongoing
royalty on the same patent; the ongoing royalty serves as a license. Certain Video Displays
and Products Using and Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-828, 2012 ITC LEXIS 1884, at
*21-27 (Aug. 1, 2012) (Final) (Order No. 9). But because district court cases must be
stayed pending ITC actions, it is rare that the ITC action comes after a district court ruling.
153 See Certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof,
Products Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories, Inv. No.
337-TA-276, USITC Pub. 2196, at 124 n,159 (May 1989) (Final) (Commission Opinion on
Violation, and Remedy, Bonding, and the Public Interest). The ITC explains:
[Tihe limited exclusion order is itself a limitation on the relief afforded a
prevailing complainant, created by the Commission without specific author-
ity in the statute. Congress has never specifically authorized the Commis-
sion to issue limited exclusion orders as the final remedy in a section 337
investigation, although it has specifically authorized them when directed at
defaulting respondents. Nevertheless, the Commission has been issuing
limited exclusion orders since 1981. In light of the extensive attention de-
voted to section 337 in the past two years, resulting in the amendments
effected by the OTCA, we believe it is reasonable to infer Congressional
acquiescence in the Commission's practice of issuing limited exclusion or-
ders from Congress' silence on the matter. This is particularly so, since
with respect to remedy matters, Congress noted the Commission's belief
that it was precluded from issuing both exclusion and cease and desist or-
ders with respect to the same unfair act, and provided specific authority for
the Commission to do so, presumably in order to expand the extent of
relief available to a prevailing complainant. Had Congress objected to the
issuance of limited rather than general exclusion orders as insufficient re-
lief, it would presumably have acted to limit the Commission's authority to
issue such orders.
Id.
154 Id. In general, an administrative agency's latitude to craft appropriate remedies,
while not unlimited, is broad. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946)
("[T] he courts will not interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable rela-
tion to the unlawful practices found to exist.").
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tor test to apply when an exclusion order implicated so-called "down-
stream products"-products that incorporated the infringing
component 55 This test reflects, in large part, a concern about the
proportionality of the ITC remedy to the "wrong" of patent infringe-
ment as reflected in Factor I ("the value of the infringing articles
compared to the value of the downstream products in which they are
incorporated"), Factor 3 ("the incremental value to the complainant
of the exclusion of downstream products"), Factor 4 ("the incremen-
tal detriment to respondents" of exclusion of such products), and Fac-
tor 5 ("the burdens imposed on third parties resulting from exclusion
of downstream products").156 When the value of the invention is
small compared to the value of the enjoined article that incorporates
the invention downstream, the ITC has paused to consider whether
the patentee deserves an injunction and if so, what type of injunction
is appropriate.' 57
Although the nine-factor test has arguably diminished in impor-
tance with the Federal Circuit's decision in Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. In-
ternational Trade Commission,'58 the concerns about undue
interference with the market that prompted it endure. High-tech
component cases are now the norm at the ITC: 86% of ITC cases filed
by NPEs between 2005 and 2011 were in high-tech sectors. 59 In this
Part, we suggest some ways in which the ITC can use its discretion to
155 Inv. No. 337-TA-276, USITC Pub. 2196, at 124-26 (Final) (Commission Opinion on
Violation, and Remedy, Bonding, and the Public Interest). The nine factors in this limited
exclusion order require the ITC to evaluate:
(1) "the value of the infringing articles compared to the value of the down-
stream products in which they are incorporated";
(2) "the identity of the manufacturer of the downstream products" (i.e.,
whether it can be determined that the downstream products are manufac-
tured by the respondent or by a third party);
(3) "the incremental value to the complainant of the exclusion of down-
stream products";
(4) "the incremental detriment to respondents" of exclusion of such
products;
(5) "the burdens imposed on third parties resulting from exclusion of
downstream products";
(6) "the availability of alternative downstream products which do not con-
tain the infringing articles";
(7) "the likelihood that imported downstream products actually contain the
infringing articles and are thereby subject to exclusion";
(8) "the opportunity for evasion of an exclusion order which does not in-
clude downstream products"; and
(9) "the enforceability of an order by Customs, etc."
Id. at 125.
156 Id.
157 See, e.g., id. at 127.
158 545 F.3d 1340, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Kyocera prohibited the exclusion of down-
stream products through a limited exclusion order, so the EPROMs test no longer applies
there. For a discussion of Kyocera, see generally Cotropia, supra note 90.
159 Kallus & Conlon, supra note 142, 16-17.
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craft remedies consistent with the statute's public interest provisions
and the Commission's EPROMs test.
Much of the ITC's potential flexibility derives from 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337, which gives the Commission broad discretion to fashion an
appropriate remedy.160 Additionally, the Federal Circuit is largely def-
erential to the ITC's remedy determinations, reversing them only
when they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law."' 6' This standard of review is less
stringent than the one that applies to the ITC's substantive patent law
determinations.16 2
The structure of the ITC's process also provides some flexibility.
Once the Commission finds a violation, it is entitled to enter an exclu-
sion order keeping infringing products out of the market.163 In some
circumstances, the Commission holds a separate hearing after a liabil-
ity finding to determine whether and what particular form of injunc-
tive relief is appropriate.164 Assuming the case warrants an exclusion
order (and, as noted above, 65 the Commission essentially always finds
that it does), the order is then subject to a sixty-day presidential review
period.16 6  But the exclusion order goes into effect immediately--
160 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006) ("Commission determinations ... with respect to its
findings on the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States
economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and
United States consumers, the amount and nature of bond, or the appropriate remedy shall
be reviewable in accordance with section 706 of title 5."); 5 U.S.C § 706 (2006) ("The
reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law. . - ."); Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. ITC, 899 F.2d 1204, 1208 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (finding, based on a review of Section 337's legislative history, that 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (A) governs the Federal Circuit's review of ITC remedy determinations); accord
Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Epistar Corp. v. ITC, 566
F.3d 1321, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
161 See Spansion, 629 F.3d at 1358 (citing Epistar, 566 F.3d at 1333); Hyundai, 899 F.2d at
1208; see also Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1355 (applying the framework established by Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to an ITC order
and stating that if "the statute in question is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is
reasonable, a court must defer to an agency's construction of a statute governing agency
conduct" (quoting Cathedral Candle Co. v. ITC, 400 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
162 Hyundai, 899 F.2d at 1208 ("Congress.. . desire(d] to subject Commission determi-
nations on the public interest, . . . bonding, and remedy, to a less stringent standard of
judicial review than determinations of substantive violations of section 337.").
163 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1).
164 Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related Software,
Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331, at 3-7 (July 15, 2011) (Final) (Commission
Opinion).
165 See supra Figure 3.
166 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) ("If, before the close of the 60-day period beginning on the
day after the day on which he receives a copy of such determination, the President, for
policy reasons, disapproves such determination and notifies the Commission of his disap-
proval, then, effective on the date of such notice, such determination and the action taken
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before the presidential review period-unless the respondent posts a
bond adequate to compensate for sales made during the review pe-
riod.' 67 And once the Commission's order is final, the respondent
can appeal to the Federal Circuit. 68
This process creates three remedies that are less harsh than sim-
ply excluding products but more powerful than simply denying an in-
junction. First, the ITC can decide what its exclusion order will cover.
It can choose-and indeed has choseni 69-to include certain prod-
ucts and exclude others in its orders. Second, the ITC can decide
when it will implement its exclusion order. It doesn't have to choose
between immediately enjoining the product or doing nothing; it can
delay the order or apply it only prospectively. Finally, the ITC can use
its statutory authority to set a bond to permit continued importation
during the review period but condition that importation on the pay-
ment of money. Small tweaks to these aspects of how the ITC awards
injunctions can potentially yield big benefits to the public interest, as
we explain below.
A. Grandfathering and Tailoring Injunction Scope
The statute directs the Commission to exclude infringing articles
unless public interest concerns dictate otherwise.170 Read with an eye
toward tailoring, the provision essentially requires the Commission to
fashion its exclusion orders so that they will pass public interest mus-
ter. An exclusion order tells a company to stop importing its prod-
uct,171 but the ITC can soften the harshness of this remedy by
grandfathering in existing models or units. When the product re-
mains available in some form and the exclusion order applies only to
under subsection (d), (e), (f), (g), or (i) of this section with respect thereto shall have no
force or effect.").
167 Id. § 1337(e)(1) ("The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its
action under this subsection directing such exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such
notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers, refuse such entry, except that such
articles shall be entitled to entry under bond prescribed by the Secretary in an amount
determined by the Commission to be sufficient to protect the complainant from any injury.
If the Commission later determines that the respondent has violated the provisions of this
section, the bond may be forfeited to the complainant."); id. § 1337(j) (3) ("[A]rticles di-
rected to be excluded from entry under subsection (d) of this section or subject to a cease
and desist order under subsection (f) of this section shall, until such determination be-
comes final, be entitled to entry under bond prescribed by the Secretary in an amount
determined by the Commission to be sufficient to protect the complainant from any injury.
If the determination becomes final, the bond may be forfeited to the complainant. The
Commission shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which bonds may be forfeited
under this paragraph.").
168 Id. § 1337(c).
169 See infra Part III.A.
170 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).
171 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
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future versions or units of the product, consumers and competition
are less likely to suffer.
The ITC has engaged in this kind of tailoring in response to these
types of public interest concerns. In Certain Baseband Processor Chips
and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips,
and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, the
Commission found that the requested full-scale exclusion order was
"not permitted in [the] investigation" due to the potential harm to
third parties.172 However, the Commission granted an adjusted exclu-
sion order that grandfathered in existing models of handsets. 73 The
grandfathering exemption caused the exclusion order to "adequately
address public interest concerns," which allowed the Commission to
issue the order. 74
The Commission has tailored exclusion scope in other cases as
well. In Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices, the Commis-
sion grandfathered refurbished replacement handsets into its exclu-
sion order,' 75 and in Certain Sortation Systems, Parts Thereof and Products
Containing Same'76 and Certain Automated Mechanical Transmission Sys-
tems for Medium-Duty and Heavy-Duty Trucks and Components Thereof, 1
the ITC exempted from its exclusion order spare parts to service ex-
isting systems and facilities, citing the exemption in its public interest
analysis. Given these precedents, we believe the ITC could use
grandfathering and related exemptions in appropriate circumstances
to protect consumer access to the noninfringing portions of complex,
multicomponent products. 78
172 Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio)
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Tele-
phone Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258, at 153 (June 19, 2007) (Final)
(Commission Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding).
173 Id. at 150-51.
174 Id. at 150.
175 Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related Software,
Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331, at 83 (July 15, 2011) (Final) (Commission Opin-
ion) ("HTC shall be permitted to import into the United States [for nineteen months]
refurbished handsets to be provided to consumers as replacements . . . .").
176 Inv. No. 337-TA-460, USITC Pub. 3588, at 2 (Jan. 27, 2003) (Preliminary) (Notice
of Violation of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Issuance of Limited Exclusion
Order) ("The Commission determined to include an exemption in the limited exclusion
order for importations of spare parts for United Parcel Service's Hub 2000 facility in Louis-
ville, Kentucky.").
177 Inv. No. 337-TA-503, USITC Pub. No. 3934, at 3 (Apr. 7, 2005) (Final) (Termina-
tion of Investigation; Issuance of a Limited Exclusion Order and a Cease and Desist Order)
("The limited exclusion order does not cover parts necessary to service infringing auto-
mated mechanical transmission systems installed on trucks prior to the issuance of the
order.")
178 See generally Golden, Injunctions, supra note 28 (discussing the scope of injunctions
issued in patent infringement cases).
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B. Delay
The Commission may also choose in certain circumstances to de-
lay the implementation of exclusion orders. 79 The Commission nor-
mally imposes an exclusion order immediately, though, as noted
above, the respondent can effectively stay an injunction for sixty days
by posting a bond.s 0 The respondent may also be able to obtain a
stay of the exclusion order pending appeal to the Federal Circuit.181
But even if neither occurs, the Commission has the power to delay the
implementation of the exclusion order. The ITC could do so in order
to give the respondent time to design around the patent or substitute
noninfringing products for goods in the pipeline, or to ensure that
consumers aren't left without products until the patentee can ramp
up production.
Delaying injunctive relief has the potential to significantly amelio-
rate the holdup problem. As Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have
shown, holdup is a result of two factors: that an injunction will prevent
the sale of noninfringing as well as infringing components in a com-
plex multicomponent product and that roughly three-fourths of liti-
gated patents are either invalid or not infringed.a 2 The fact that an
injunction will shut down noninfringing matter means that it costs the
respondent more than the patent itself is worth. 83 Rather than pay
that extra cost in settlement, the respondent will sometimes design
179 Personal Data, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, at 81 (Commission Opinion) ("T-Mobile itself
has advised the Commission that a four-month transition period would likely be suffi-
cient.. ... We find T-Mobile's suggestion to be reasonable and within our authority to
implement." (citations omitted)).
180 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1) (2006).
181 Id. § 1337(c).
182 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 1996, 2019 & n.71. A number of scholars have
tried to attack this holdup analysis. See Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking
Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 535, 535-40 (2008); J.
Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent In-
fingement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REv. 714, 718-20 (2008). But those
attacks miss the mark; rather than demonstrate that holdup doesn't exist, these scholars
have uniformly argued that patentees deserve the holdup value of their patents, asserting
that patentees-unlike everyone else in a market economy-should be paid the full social
value of their invention. See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust
Responses, 34J. CORP. L. 1151, 1153-54, 1162-71 (2009). John Golden has taken a different
tack, arguing that it is unfair to treat PAEs differently than product-producing plaintiffs.
John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEx. L. REv. 2111, 2147-60 (2007)
[hereinafter Golden, Patent Trolls]. But that too misses the point; if one patient needs a
kidney and another doesn't, it isn't discrimination to give a kidney only to the one who can
show need for it. Similarly, granting injunctions only to parties who can prove they will
suffer irreparable injury without it isn't discrimination even though it has different effects
on different plaintiffs. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply: Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2163, 2163-65, 2169 (2007).
183 Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Informa-
tion, 85 TEX. L. REv. 783, 794-95 (2007).
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around the patent to avoid the effect of an injunction.18 4 But because
most patent suits lose, most advance design-arounds are wasted ef-
fort. 85 The patentee can opportunistically capture the cost of design-
around in settlement, even if the patent is likely to be invalid or not
infringed.186
Delaying the onset of an injunction or exclusion order changes
the dynamic. As Lemley and Shapiro show, respondents who can
count on a delay to allow them to design around the patent don't
need to invest in unnecessary design-arounds to avoid the risk of in-
junction holdup.18 7 As a result, they don't need to pay the owners of
weak patents premiums to avoid spending on design-arounds. They
can design around the patent only if it becomes necessary to do so.
Design-arounds take time-not only to devise, test, and implement in
the manufacturing process but sometimes also to gain any necessary
regulatory approval. A transition period softens the blow of pulling a
product from the market. The Federal Circuit acknowledged this in
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., remarking that "sunset provisions
mitigate the harm to the public" as a remedy that protects rights
"while allowing ... time to develop noninfringing substitutes."' 88
A delay to allow design-around has another benefit as well: it can
help distinguish between patents that really are critical and those that
aren't. Giving a respondent, say, six months to design around the pat-
ent provides a sort of acid test of the claim that the patent is in fact
necessary to practice the invention. If the respondent can design
around the patent in six months, the invention it embodies arguably
wasn't that valuable, and it probably isn't worth holding up the entire
product for a patent that was essentially optional. By contrast, if the
respondent can't design around the patent and still sell a product eco-
nomically, the patent really is valuable, and arguably we should worry
less about the risk of holdup caused by the exclusion order. And un-
like the district courts with their limited Article III jurisdiction, the
ITC has the power to issue advisory opinions as to whether a design-
184 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 2002.
185 See id. at 2019 n.71.
186 See id. at 2002, 2005.
187 See id. at 2038; accord Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 182, at 2131.
188 543 F.3d 683, 701, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (approving a district court's injunction that
included a twenty-month "sunset provision" that reduced harm to the public interest); Ver-
izon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1311 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(noting, in dicta, the benefits of a work-around period, though one was not requested by
the defendant); see also Golden, Injunctions, supra note 28, at 1461 n.261 (noting and
describing cases in which courts have delayed injunctions to avoid the "special disruption"
of immediately entered injunctions).
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around also infringes the patent,189 a fact that can save a great deal of
cost and uncertainty in subsequent litigation. 90
Patentees might object that delaying the injunction is unfair to
them because if the respondent can design around the patent, the
patentee will receive nothing. But if the design-around costs more
than the original product, the parties should be able to settle for the
difference in value-which is really the value of the patent in the first
place. And if the design-around is easy and just as cheap, the actual
value of the patented technology is zero; any payment to the patentee
in that case is a windfall.
The ITC has started to recognize the benefits of staying exclusion
orders. In Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and
Related Software, the Commission found that the immediate exclusion
of the infringing devices "would not be in the public interest" because
of its impact on market competition.19' A four-month period of ex-
clusion, however, would provide time for replacement handsets to be
devised and provided to customers.1 92 The Commission tailored its
injunction accordingly, explaining that "competitive conditions in the
United States do not weigh against the issuance of an exclusion order,
but favor providing a transition period." 9 3
As this case demonstrates, incorporating a delay allows the ITC to
award exclusion orders where the public interest might dictate other-
wise. And there may be a way to compensate patentees for the value
of their technology during the period of stay. This possibility relates
to the final area of remedial flexibility at the ITC: monetary relief.
C. Bonds and Penalties
Although the ITC doesn't routinely award stays, it does routinely
sanction the continued importation of articles even after they have
been found to be infringing. While the ITC can't award damages, 19
U.S.C. § 1337(j) (3) authorizes it to set a bond that the respondent
189 Eaton Corp. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int'l Trade 1149, 1152 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005)
(noting this option); 19 C.F.R. § 210.79 (2012). For a discussion of the strategic considera-
tions that go into deciding whether to seek such an opinion, see Merritt R. Blakeslee &
Christopher V. Meservy, Seeking Adjudication of a Design-Around in Section 337 Patent Infringe-
ment Investigations: Procedural Context and Strategic Considerations, 35 AIPIA Q.J. 385, 408-11
(2007).
190 Indeed, in Ninestar Technology Co. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal Cir-
cuit chastised the respondent for not taking advantage of this procedure before imple-
menting its alleged design-around. 667 F.3d 1373, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
191 Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related Software,
Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331, at 81 (July 15, 2011) (Final) (Commission Opin-
ion) ("[The] immediate exclusion of HTC (devices] would have a substantial impact on T-
Mobile's competitiveness . .
192 See id.
193 Id. at 83.
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can post to allow continued importation through the sixty-day presi-
dential review period. 94 The amount of the bond must be "sufficient
to protect the complainant from any injury,"' 95 and it is typically
based on the difference in price between complainant's product and
the infringing imports. 96 Requiring respondents to post a bond to
delay implementation of the exclusion order pending the presidential
review period is effectively a payment of an ongoing royalty.
Because the president essentially never reverses an ITC deci-
sion,' 9 7 respondents almost always forfeit the bond. They pay an
ongoing royalty for the privilege of continuing to sell their products
for another sixty days. And if the bond is set correctly, it will mimic
the amount of an ongoing royalty in district court, which is the value
of the patent based on the number of goods sold.198 There is no pol-
icy reason the ITC shouldn't be allowed to impose a delay longer than
sixty days in exchange for payment of a comparably higher bond. The
ITC could stay the order pending appeal, for instance, subject to a
bond.
The amount of the bond would depend on the equities of the
case. In Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices, where imple-
mentation of the exclusion order was delayed by four months, the ITC
entered a bond amount of zero,199 although in other cases it may be
more.2 0 0 Combining a delay in the implementation of an exclusion
194 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j) (2006); A LAWYER's GUIDE TO SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS
BEFORE THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 70, at 186 n.41.
195 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(3).
196 Personal Data, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, at 85 (Commission Opinion).
197 The White House has only ever done so five times. See, e.g., A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS BEFORE THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Supra
note 70, at 187-88 & n.45. As of 2005, the White House delegated this power to the U.S.
Trade Representative. Assignment of Certain Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,251 (uly 26, 2005).
198 On the calculation of ongoing royalties in district court, see Mark A. Lemley, The
Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties, 76 Mo. L. REv. 695, 701-02 (2011).
199 The opinion suggests that the amount could have been higher had Apple
presented better evidence of the price differential. Personal Data, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, at
85 (Commission Opinion) ("Apple failed to satisfy its burden . . . .").
200 The amount of the bond is often set at 100%. See, e.g., Certain Radio Control
Hobby Transmitters and Receivers and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-763,
2011 ITC LEXIS 1927, at *2 (Sept. 27, 2011) (Final) (Limited Exclusion Order); Certain
Toner Cartridges and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-740, 2011 ITC LEXIS 1930, at
*12-13 (Sept. 27, 2011) (Final) (Cease and Desist Order); Certain Birthing Simulators and
Associated Systems, Inv. No. 337-TA-759, 2011 ITC LEXIS 2125, at *3 (Aug. 29, 2011) (Fi-
nal) (Limited Exclusion Order). In many cases this amount of bond would seem to be far
more than "sufficient to protect the complainant from any injury," as provided in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(j) (3), especially when the invention is a small component of the infringing article.
The 2012 order excluding Motorola phones, by contrast, set a bond of thirty-three cents
per phone, reflecting the relatively small role the patented invention played in the value of
the imported phone, which is worth several hundred dollars. Certain Mobile Devices, As-
sociated Software, and Components Thereof, 337-TA-744, 2012 ITC LEXIS 1042, at *6-7
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order with a bond compensating the patentee for the value of the
invention during the period of delay would allow the ITC to approxi-
mate the power a district court has to deny or stay injunctive relief
while ordering payment of an ongoing royalty.20 1 This combination
will often be the best possible remedy, and certainly it is preferable to
the other apparent options: patent holdup by an immediate exclusion
order or no remedy at all.
Implementing bond periods longer than sixty days may require
some creativity, however. Section 1337(j) (3) seems to contemplate
that the bond must terminate at the end of the presidential review
period, when the Commission's order becomes "final," even though
that final order will still be subject to appeal. 202 One possibility is to
change this statutory language to give the ITC more flexibility in de-
termining the length of time covered by a bond. Another, simpler
possibility is for the ITC to wait to publish its final notice of finding of
violation in the Federal Register until after the delay period ends. By
making a preliminary holding rather than a published "determina-
tion," the ITC may be able to delay the beginning of the sixty-day
clock for presidential review.203
The ITC's authority to assess and impose civil penalties for viola-
tions of its orders provides another option for the ITC to provide a
monetary component to its remedy, even in spite of its inability to
award damages. 204 The ITC has wide latitude in setting penalties,
(May 18, 2012) (Final) (Notice of a Commission Final Determination of Violation of Sec-
tion 337; Issuance of a Limited Exclusion Order; Termination of Investigation).
One complication for bonding, both under our proposal and existing practice, arises
with the growth of NPEs at the ITC. If the patentee doesn't sell the patented invention,
there is no price differential to use as a baseline to measure the value of the patent. But
district courts confront valuation problems all the time with the help of economists, and
the mechanisms they use for apportionment of the value of complex products may also be
used at the ITC to set the amount of a bond in an NPE case.
201 The analogy isn't perfect; a bond is presumably set against the possibility of some
contingent future event, however unlikely. The power to order payment of a bond might
not extend to the power to order the payment of money directly to the complainant with
no hope of recovery. But conditioning a bond on something like an appeal will generally
achieve the same result.
202 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006).
203 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(1) provides that the sixty-day review period begins when the
Commission publishes its determination in the Federal Register and transmits the finding
to the President; the order becomes final sixty days thereafter.
204 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (2) ("Any person who violates an order issued by the Com-
mission under paragraph (1) after it has become final shall forfet and pay to the United
States a civil penalty for each day on which an importation of articles, or their sale, occurs in
violation of the order of not more than the greater of $100,000 or twice the domestic value
of the articles entered or sold on such day in violation of the order. Such penalty shall
accrue to the United States and may be recovered for the United States in a civil action
brought by the Commission in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia or
for the district in which the violation occurs." (emphasis added)).
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which are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.205 In San Huan New
Materials High Tech, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal
Circuit endorsed the ITC's approach to setting penalties based on:
(1) the good or bad faith of the respondent; (2) any injury due to
the infringement; (3) the respondent's ability to pay the assessed
penalty; (4) the extent to which the respondent benefitted [sic]
from its violations; (5) the need to vindicate the authority of the
Commission; and (6) the public interest.206
The Commission's approach to determining the amount of pen-
alty "[takes] into account the 'three overarching considerations enu-
merated by Congress in the legislative history [of section 337(f) (2) ],
viz., the desire to deter violations, the intentional or unintentional na-
ture of any violations, and the public interest.' "207 A Commission in-
terested in ensuring that patentees are compensated but unwilling to
exclude products altogether might be able to use this authority to ef-
fectively "preannounce" the penalty for violating an exclusion order-
in effect converting that penalty into a price to be paid for the impor-
tation of infringing goods.
D. Exercising Discretion Wisely
The ITC has broad discretion within the bounds of section 1337
to set and shape the remedy for infringement.20  It should exercise its
remedial flexibility when the risk of holdup is substantial. Holdup is
likely when the defendant sells a multicomponent product and the
novel feature of the patent covers only a small part of that product.2 09
Different remedies might be appropriate in different situations that
205 See Ninestar Tech. Co. v. ITC, 667 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Assessment of
a civil penalty under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) is reviewed on the standard of abuse of discre-
tion . . . ." (citation omitted)); Genentech, Inc. v. USITC, 122 F.3d 1409, 1414 (Fed. Cir.
1997). This means that an ITC ruling is reviewed for whether it: "(1) is clearly unreasona-
ble, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on
clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) follows from a record that contains no evidence on
which the decision-making body could rationally base its decision." Ninestar, 667 F.3d at
1379 (quoting Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1415). Commission penalties may also trigger consti-
tutional review if due process concerns are raised. See Ninestar, 667 F.3d at 1382.
206 Ninestar, 667 F.3d at 1379 (citing San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. ITC,
161 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Ninestar also confirms that the ITC, as well as the
district courts, has the authority to determine and enforce civil penalties. See id. at 1384.
207 San Huan, 161 F.3d at 1362 (second alteration in original).
208 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (providing that review of remedial decisions is subject to defer-
ence under the Administrative Procedure Act, including presumably Chevron deference to
reasonable interpretations of the statute).
209 Patent claims will often be written to cover an entire product even though the
patentee's contribution is limited to a single small feature. The inventor of the intermit-
tent windshield wiper, for instance, might claim a car with an intermittent windshield
wiper. The Commission should focus on what the patentee actually contributed to the art,
not the form in which the patentee chooses to write the claim. See Mark A. Lemley, Point of
Novelty, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1253, 1255 (2011).
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present holdup problems. For example, when companies design in-
teroperable products to work together, switching costs become high
once the standards are implemented.210 In this case, grandfathering
in of existing models can ameliorate the harms.
Another issue arises when switching, costly or not, imposes signifi-
cant harm on customers who cannot get support or service for prod-
ucts already sold; the short-term impact on consumers is high in these
cases. 211 Here, either a stay or an exception allowing service and
spare parts might help solve these problems. 2 1 2
Third, in multicomponent cases, collateral damage to third par-
ties who make noninfringing products may be high because those
third parties have already made irreversible investments.
Grandfathering can help in some of these cases, but not all; bonding
may be the best remedy in this circumstance. 2 1 3
Finally, the ITC may wish to consider three other factors in set-
ting remedies: whether the patentee is a PAE, whether the defendant
is a willful infringer, and whether the patent is standards-essential.
While the statutory public interest factors are party neutral, 2 1 4 the pat-
210 See, e.g., Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver
(Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular
Telephone Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258, at 149 (June 19, 2007) (Fi-
nal) (Commission Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding) ("As to competi-
tive conditions in the U.S. economy, exclusion would likely result in some adverse impact
on the development of advanced telecommunications technology and on expansion of
broadband internet access. These technologies are important in their own right, but they
also have significant effects on other economic activity in the United States. Downstream
relief would make it more difficult for telecommunications companies to expand 3G cellu-
lar telephone services and broadband internet access, and make it more difficult for con-
sumers, including businesses, to access these services.").
211 See Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related
Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331, at 72-73 (July 15, 2011) (Final) (Com-
mission Opinion).
212 See id. at 72, 79-84.
213 See Baseband Processor Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, at 153 (Commission Opinion on
Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding) ("The potential harm to economic actors, in
this case including handset manufacturers and telecommunications service providers, is
properly part of our EPROMs analysis, and we have indeed fully weighed potential harm to
third parties and to legitimate trade in that prior analysis. In fact, under our EPROMs
analysis, we found that full downstream relief was not permitted in this investigation due to,
among other things, the magnitude of the impact on third parties."); id. at 153-54 (con-
cluding that "a downstream remedy with a grandfathering exception does not raise public
interest concerns" because "the relief we propose has a much more limited impact on
availability of 3G-capable handsets, and thus a lesser impact on the public interest"). More
generally, Greg Sidak has developed a detailed taxonomy for applying the public interest
factors to holdup situations. Sidak, Law and Economics, supra note 130, at 60-93, 170-72.
214 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006). In contrast, the domestic industry requirement is
not, as the ITC currently interprets, party-neutral. NPEs do not need to prove the so-called
technical prong that requires "articles protected by the patent." Id. § 1337(a)(3). One of
us has argued that this is inconsistent with the statute and its legislative history. See Chien,
Protecting Domestic Industries, supra note 73, at 180-81.
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entee's status as a PAE can influence the impact of an exclusion order
to competition and consumers since it affects the patentee's need for
an injunction (a competitive condition) and, when many defendants
are sued, the likelihood that consumers will have access to alternative
products.
In a similar vein, we believe that the ITC should generally not
grant injunctions for standards-essential patents, in particular those
that are subject to reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) licens-
ing obligations. The ITC has the power to reject an exclusion order
where the respondent is licensed to import the product.215 Whether
or not a RAND commitment to a standard-setting organization is an
executable license,216 competition and consumers would be disserved
if patents that were promised to be available for licensing on fair and
reasonable terms were the basis of exclusion orders.217 And if the suit
were brought late in the product life cycle, after a standard has been
adopted,25 8 switching costs to consumers and competitors would likely
be higher. The Department of Justice has expressed similar concerns
about using such patents to get injunctions, noting that:
F/RAND requirements have not prevented significant disputes
from arising in connection with the licensing of [standards-essential
patents (SEPs)], including actions by patent holders seeking injunc-
tive or exclusionary relief that could alter competitive market out-
comes. . . . [T]he division continues to have concerns about the
potential inappropriate use of SEPs to disrupt competition .... 219
At the same time, companies shouldn't be encouraged to copy
and take their chances while infringing based on the absence of in-
junctive relief. This concern isn't much of a problem in the informa-
tion technology industries today; the evidence suggests that virtually
all defendants in patent cases are innocent infringers, not copiers.220
215 Tessera, Inc. v. ITC, 646 F.3d 1357, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
216 For an argument that it is an executable license, see Lemley, Intellectual Property
Rights, supra note 23, at 1925.
217 See generally Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-
Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRusT L.J. 855 (2011) (discussing RAND commitments and
effects on competition); Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of
Patent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST LJ. 889 (2011) (same).
218 Research by Brian Love shows that NPEs tend to assert their patents late in the life
of the patent, as compared to practicing entities. See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of
Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Inno-
vators?, U. PA. L. Rxv. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssm
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1917709.
219 Statement of the Department offustices Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investi-
gations of Google Inc.'s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Cer-
tain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
(Feb. 13, 2012), wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-at-210.html.
220 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421, 1424 (2009).
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But proof of deliberate infringement should incline the Commission
to look askance at claims that the defendant needs an opportunity to
design around a patent; the intentional infringer presumably has had
that opportunity already.22 '
In addition to the substantive changes discussed above, we make
a procedural suggestion. One downside of increased tailoring of ITC
exclusion orders is that it could lead to increased unpredictability as
to the remedy, at least in the short term. Currently, summary determi-
nation proceedings in the ITC222 rarely if ever involve issues of rem-
edy.2 23 But nothing prevents litigants from bringing such motions.
Indeed, the ITC's recent move to allow for earlier briefing on public
interest issues seems to support just this possibility.224 If a case is not
one in which an exclusion order is appropriate, all parties benefit
from making that clear up front before unnecessarily litigating ques-
tions of validity and infringement.
Finally, we suggest that the ITC consult with other government
agencies in appropriate cases.225 On several occasions, the ITC has
relied on the policies of other parts of the government to support its
decision making. In two out of the three cases in which the ITC de-
clined to award an exclusion order, it relied upon the policies of the
President and Congress to explain its position.226 In Baseband Processor
221 We use the term "deliberate infringement" rather than "willfulness" here because
patent law's willfulness doctrine varies in significant ways from what an ordinary observer
would think of as purposeful conduct. Because willfulness is a continuing offense, patent
law may designate someone willful merely because she didn't stop selling the product once
sued. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Wilifulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1089-93 (2003). That behavior is not deliberate conduct in any
normal sense. On the other hand, patent law will not find willfulness if the defendant's
conduct was objectively reasonable, even if the defendant intended to infringe. See In re
Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc); id. at 1385 (Newman,
J., concurring) ("[The standard of 'recklessness' appears to ratify intentional
disregard . . . .").
222 19 C.F.R. § 210.18 (2012) prescribes the procedures that are used for summary
determination. As subsection (b) describes:
The determination sought by the moving party shall be rendered if
pleadings and any depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a sum-
mary determination as a matter of law.
19 C.F.R. § 210.18(b) (2012).
223 See Czebiniak, supra note 8, at 107.
224 19 C.F.R. § 210.8, .10(b), .14(f), .42(a)(1)(ii) (C), .50(a)(4).
225 The ITC is required to "consult with, and seek advice and information from, the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department ofJustice, the Federal Trade
Commission, and such other departments and agencies as it considers appropriate." 19
U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (2006).
226 See Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119, at 23-24 (Dec. 29, 1980) (Final) (Commission Action and
Order) (citing in support of its decision not to grant an order enjoining Dowlish tubes
used for research the fact that "the President and the Congress have issued declarations of
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Chips, where the ITC custom tailored the injunction it ordered, the
Commission cited the public comments of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion.2 27 In the ITC's recent Personal Data and Mobile Communications
Devices decision, in which it delayed the start of the exclusion order for
four months, the Commission drew from statements of the Depart-
ment of Justice and President Barack Obama to support its decision
making. 228 Historically, there have been few instances of agencies
submitting formal comments to ITC investigations,229 but where a
proposed exclusion order poses a danger to the public interest, other
agencies can and should weigh in during the ITC review process.230
CONCLUSION
eBay has had the unintended consequence of driving patentees to
the ITC in hopes of obtaining an injunction no longer available in the
federal district courts. Though eBay's flexible four-factor test doesn't
apply at the ITC, the Commission has more power to adjust the reme-
dies it grants than commentators have previously recognized. The
ITC should use this power to limit exclusion orders in circumstances
in which the patentee can hold up defendants. Delaying implementa-
tion of exclusion orders and grandfathering in existing products can
avoid holdup problems. Bond and penalty provisions can ensure
compensation for patentees who experience ongoing infringement
during these transition periods, and a few tweaks to the statutory lan-
support for basic science research" and that "Congress authorizes and directs the National
Science Foundation" to conduct research for the benefit of the general welfare); Certain
Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 20 (Dec. 17, 1979)
(Final) (Opinion of Vice Chairman Alberger and Commissioners Bedell and Stern) (justi-
fying its decision not to exclude efficient crankpin grinders in part by "the fact that Con-
gress and the President have also clearly established a policy requiring automotive
companies to increase the fuel economy of the automobiles they produce"); see also supra
notes 99-101 and accompanying text (describing the three cases in which the Commission
did not grant an exclusion order).
227 Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio)
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Tele-
phone Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258, at 144-46 (June 19, 2007) (Final)
(Commission Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding).
228 Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related Software,
Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331, at 29-31 (July 15, 2011) (Final) (Commission
Opinion).
229 Our search of the U.S. ITC Electronic Document Information System for the term
"comments" in section 337 actions yielded a handful of agency comments, see, for exam-
ple, Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing De-
vices, Computers and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 (June 6, 2012) (Final)
(Third Party United States Federal Trade Commission's Statement on the Public Interest),
as well as comments from Congress and a few states.
230 We also encourage greater coordination between innovation and competition
agencies. See, e.g., Hearing on the ITC and Patent Disputes, supra note 10, at 3 (statement of
Albert A. Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute).
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guage would give the ITC still more freedom to tailor its remedies.
The resulting system won't look exactly like eBay, but it will accom-
plish many of the same ends.
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